

Norwegian Aid & Sustainable Development

*Focus on environment in NORAD and decentralised
management of natural resources in rural development.
Project case from Zambia.*

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Preface

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List of abbreviations

ADC = Area development committee

ADMADE = The Administrative Management Design (first called Lupande development project)

CAMPFIRE = Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (Zimbabwe)

CBD = the Convention on Biological Diversity

CBNRM = Community-based Natural Resource Management

CITES = the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna

CRB = Community Resource Board

FAO = Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN)

GRZ = Government of the Republic of Zambia

IUCN = International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources/The World Conservation Union

LGMA = Lupande Game Management Area

LIRDP = Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project

MFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NORAD = Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation

SD = Sustainable Development

SEDC = Strategy for Environment in Development co-operation (my abbreviation)

SLAMU = South Luangwa Area Management Unit

SLNP = South Luangwa National Park

UNCED = United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNDP = United Nations Development Programme

UNEP = United Nations Environment Programme

UNGASS = United Nations General Assembly Special Session

VAG = Village Action Group

WCED = World Commission on Environment and Development (also called the Brundtland Report)

WCS = World Conservation Strategy

WWF = World Wildlife Fund

ZAWA = Zambia Wildlife Authority (semi-autonomous)

1. General introduction.

I have chosen a theme that involves both international and national goals for development. This is a study of Norwegian Aid¹ and Sustainable Development in Underdeveloped Countries with focus on sustainable use of natural resources in rural development. I will be looking at the importance and understanding of the concept of Sustainable Development in Norwegian Development Co-operation. I have also chosen two international conventions to see what kind of impact they have on the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD), and the possible impact on a specific development project in Zambia – the South Luangwa Area management Unit (SLAMU)². The two conventions are the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES). Norwegian authorities signed and ratified CITES in 1976 and CBD in 1993.

Norwegian authorities constantly use "sustainable" in their descriptions of what development should be. In doing this, they have committed themselves to certain criteria for how the development co-operation should be executed. How do they handle the duality of the concept, since it is both highly symbolic in strategies but also a concrete objective to work for in projects? Will short-term economic and social improvement be prioritised even if it leads to serious degradation of natural resources, or will people be able to see that sometimes, the prioritisation of natural resource conservation will lead to economic and social improvement in the long run? To what extent are impacts of SD, CBD and CITES evident in practical development projects? How important are environmental considerations seen to be by NORAD personnel? How are natural resources used and conserved in development projects?

¹ Aid and Development co-operation is considered to be the same, and will therefore be used interchangeably. However, development co-operation will be used as far as possible, except where it is not well suited for pedagogical reasons. This is in line with the way it is used by the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD) and my view is the same as theirs; development co-operation is a better, more neutral conception which should be used instead of aid as far as possible.

² Throughout the thesis 'the project', LIRDP, and SLAMU will be used interchangeably. The project was originally called LIRDP= Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project, until the name was changed 01.01.1999 to SLAMU. Further explanations about this will follow in chapter 2.

1.1 Norwegian Development Co-operation.

The management of Norwegian public aid is divided between The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the directorate underneath it, NORAD. The MFA has the responsibility for the multilateral³ part and disaster relief, while NORAD administers the long-term and bilateral⁴ part. In addition the Ministry of the Environment has responsibility for environmental assistance in Norwegian development co-operation. I will only look at the bilateral development co-operation.

NORAD has a lot of strategies, but the ones which are the most important in this study are the Report (White Paper) no.19 (1995-1996) to the Storting, “A changing world - Main elements of Norwegian policy towards developing countries”, and the “Strategy for environment in development co-operation”(SEDC)1997-2005 (Ås: 2002 [interview]). In addition, the main strategy “NORAD invests in the future, NORAD’s strategy for 2000-2005” will be elaborated on further in chapters 2 and 4 to, among other things, show the symbolic value of its contents⁵. The first mentioned strategy explains the background for changes in the Norwegian policy towards developing countries and lists the most important aspects of this policy. More than earlier development co-operation is used to support peace and democratisation processes, human rights work has increased and the environment has become a central area of support. Consideration of ecological sustainability is sought to be integrated in all development co-operation⁶. The principle of recipient responsibility is also highlighted⁷. The second aspect is more specific as a follow up of one of the main points in Report no 19, namely contribution to a responsible management of the environment on earth and biological diversity– as the superior goal of SEDC.

³ Multilateral aid = the kind that is distributed through international organisations like the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and The International Monetary Fund (IMF).

⁴ Bilateral development co-operation= means the co-operation between Norway and single developing countries, based on an agreement between the two countries. NORAD is the responsible executing institution.

⁵ The other strategies are; "HIV/AIDS and development - Norway's views", "NORAD's Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Action Plan", report no. 21 to the Storting "Action plan for human rights", NORAD's "Handbook in Human Rights Assessment", and "Strategy for female- and equal rights oriented development co-operation".

⁶ <http://odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/publ/stmeld/032005-040003/index-dok000-b-f-a.html>

⁷ For a further description of the white paper; see 2.3.1

In addition there are strategic guidelines from the Foreign Ministry in the yearly allocation letters. These are the important overarching strategies for NORAD when considering environmental issues.

1.2 Research goals and objectives

Biological diversity is not spread evenly around the globe, nor are the means or the knowledge on how to use it in a sustainable manner. Most notably, the greatest variety of flora and fauna and the greatest losses of this diversity are in developing countries (Rosendal: 1999, Stenseth: 1999). Biodiversity is important because it offers choice, and choice helps people to manage change, whether instigated by economic, social or environmental factors, or a combination (Koziell & Saunders 2000:2). The consequences of not addressing biodiversity as a part of development decision-making processes are likely to be most serious for the financially poor and marginalised (ibid: 7, Paavola: 2001).

However, in the long run this will affect us all as the environmental services supported by biodiversity will be impaired⁸ (Koziell & Saunders: 2000). Biodiversity gives a good basis for reaching sustainable development. As the WCED (1987: 147) stated, the challenge facing nations today is no longer deciding if conservation is a good idea, but rather how it can be implemented in the national interest and within the means available in each country. Since the developing countries don't have the necessary means, developed countries have to contribute through development co-operation, so that the biological diversity within the borders of developing countries is sustained. Developed nations are well placed to undertake remedial efforts given their productive, technological, and financial capacity (Lafferty & Meadowcroft 2000: 2-3.) It is

⁸ Biodiversity is the medium through which air, water, gases and chemicals are moderated and exchanged to create environmental services (which are categorised as indirect use as opposed to direct use like subsistence). It takes place over a wide scale with watershed protection, carbon storage and on a smaller scale via nutrient cycling. Pest and disease control. It ensures the continued functioning, resilience and productivity of ecosystems which provide the 'direct use' goods. (from Koziell & Sauders 2000:3 (table 1).

..important to recognise that the international consensus around SD is based upon a principle of 'differentiated responsibility', with the rich countries having publicly acknowledged an obligation to take action, particularly with respect to- among other areas- the provision of development assistance and environmental technology transfer to developing countries. (ibid: 3).

According to Lafferty & Meadowcroft it is unlikely that developing countries will take SD seriously, if the affluent societies of the North do not demonstrably do so. Thus the attitude of developed countries becomes crucial to the viability of the entire international process of engagement with sustainable development⁹ (ibid., CBD 1992).

I think it is important that the differentiated responsibility that Lafferty & Meadowcroft mention, and which is also recognised by CBD, is followed by developed countries. Even when the transfer of expensive technological means is not needed, like it can be with development based on natural resources, the developing countries still need support in different forms¹⁰. One of my informants mentioned that the most successful projects he knew about were not expensive (Eid 2003: [interview]). Biological diversity is a very important resource for further advancement in developing countries, which can bring better livelihoods for local people as well as secure food and medicine for the whole world through maintaining the genetic diversity.

There is much too little knowledge about the ecosystems on the planet, and because of this it is important to act with caution and always seek out sustainable or beneficial ways to bring development to poor people. In this way, biological diversity can also be secured for future generations. The realisation that biological diversity has a great value, not the least in creating development for poor people through conservation and sustainable use, is not new to NORAD. It is an important part of the environmental considerations in NORAD's work and is emphasised in many present strategies and reports¹¹. If the written strategies were the same as the practical work,

⁹ This is connected to the notion that developing countries are afraid of having their development reduced by developed nations' arguments for environmental considerations. Developed nations have to show that they also put restraints on how their own continued development can evolve.

¹⁰ Besides transfer of technological means, other forms of support can be information, education, institutional co-operation and so on, which need not be so expensive.

¹¹ E.g. Report no. 19 (1995-96), Strategy for Environment in Development cooperation (SEDC), NORAD's strategy to the year 2005, and the Norwegian national report on implementation of the CBD.

sustainable development including poverty reduction, conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, would have been realised to a higher degree a long time ago. Unfortunately, it seems very difficult to implement the strategies; therefore I wish to find out why it seems so problematic for NORAD to include environmental considerations in the development work. Maybe they haven't had the right competence or will to integrate environmental issues in the development work? Or maybe the new stronger focus¹² on the connection between poverty reduction and sustainable development will make it easier to fulfil both?

My **goals** in this thesis are:

First, to look at the importance of the mentioned concept for NORAD, by using Lafferty & Meadowcroft's definition of Sustainable Development to see **how Sustainable Development is used and if the three dimensions¹³ within the concept are equally emphasised in NORAD.**

Second, the importance of the conventions for NORAD will be looked at through how they are mentioned in strategies, and how they are used by NORAD employees, which I intend to find out through reading the strategies and guidelines and through interviewing NORAD employees. The main question in relation to the conventions will be; **To what extent and in which ways have CBD and CITES influenced NORAD's strategies and how are they used in the daily work?**

Third, the importance of the concept and conventions will be considered at project level in a developing country, through looking at a concrete NORAD-financed project in Zambia, SLAMU, which has sustainable development and poverty reduction as its main objectives (LIRD project documents, Larsen 2002 [interview], Lomøy 2002 [interview]), Grøva 2002 [interview]). **To what extent and in which ways have Sustainable Development, CBD and CITES influenced the SLAMU project? How do they promote or hamper the project?**

¹² According to Knut Opsal in NORAD, the new minister Hilde Frafjord Johnson (election, fall 2001) has especially pointed out that the connection between poverty reduction and sustainable development is very important, and has to be focused on more thoroughly.

¹³ The three dimensions are social development, economic development and environmental protection, and they are seen as interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of SD. See 2.1 for elaboration.

Fourth, I will examine the institutional relationship between NORAD and SLAMU in light of institutional theory and how these two institutions work together to promote development with implementation theory as an analytical tool. I wish to see how the institutional relationship and their co-operation affect SLAMU's community-programme. Since Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) is promoted through the programme, and this is considered by NORAD as one of two areas within SLAMU where their main goals can be reached, namely empowerment and poverty reduction, it will be interesting to see **how NORAD affects the community-programme, or more specifically how NORAD's involvement in SLAMU promotes or hampers the work of the community-programme.**




Figure 1 Analytical model

The model shows that the role of the concept and conventions for NORAD and SLAMU will be examined, since Zambia and Norway are parties to the conventions and both countries state that they work to reach sustainable development. The institutional relationship between NORAD and SLAMU is also important to examine, to see in what positive and negative ways they have affected each other. Since my main focus is on the community-programme, it is especially interesting to see how NORAD affects that. My original plan was also to examine the relationship between SLAMU and Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) and SLAMU and the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ), but since the ministry have not answered my questions, and I was only able to interview one person in ZAWA, there is not much I can say about their points of view. Whenever appropriate there will be some reflections in the analysis as far as my data allows it.

The case study can contribute to the debate on centralisation versus decentralisation of management responsibility. By studying the empirical results in light of different theories, we can hopefully contribute to a better understanding of why some things function and others don't – which again will give grounds for better projects and investments in sustainable development. This means that my goal is to contribute with an outsiders view on how NORAD works, and maybe some suggestions about what can be done differently, or to get further results. Secondly, I will try to share the results of this study as openly as possible, so that people wanting to develop similar projects, or already working on some, can avoid the mistakes made in LIRD/SLAMU and maybe implement measures resembling the successful parts of the project. By revealing the problems and prospects for this kind of project, we can hopefully learn something on how to succeed with “win-win” project, and show that it is possible to combine development with environment like the WCED stated in 1987. In March 2002 there was a conference in Norway on Poverty, Development and Environment, which resulted in a report with advice¹⁴. It highlights the fact that

¹⁴ <http://www.forskningradet.no/bibliotek/publikasjonsdatabase/detalj.html?id=96351> The director at the Christian Michelsen Institute, Gunnar Sørbø, says that a more holistic environment and development research can reduce the conflicts between rich and poor countries, because the focus from rich countries has been more on environment and the poor countries have focused on development. In combining the two, conflicts can be avoided (<http://www.forskningradet.no/nyheter/notiser/melding.html/12850>). I participated in the conference and highly agree with the resulting advice.

the agendas for environment and development have drifted apart both politically and in research, since the UN meeting in Rio ten years ago. Therefore this thesis will be a follow up of both WCED and the mentioned conference, in being a contribution to connecting the two research fields. I hope to show that it is possible, interesting and necessary to connect them.

Being situated in Norway, I have a special advantage since NORAD has been partly financing the project almost from the beginning. I have had access to the files on the project at NORAD headquarters and at the embassy in Lusaka. I have been able to interview people who have been involved with SLAMU at different times and in different positions, both in Norway and in Zambia. It is also suited for a case study because it has been well documented over a long period of time, which makes it possible to look at which efforts have been made and which of them have been successful or unsuccessful. This provides a good possibility for learning from prior mistakes, in adopting a learning process which embraces problems and barriers as a means of discussion and a catalyst for active, appropriate change (Robinson 1996: 5).

The former phases of the project will serve as background information to make sure that we have a clear understanding of the goals and the efforts that have been made. The analysis will mainly be based on phase IV, which lasted from 1999 to 2002. The fact that I am an 'outsider' might also bring some new perspectives on the project. As far as I know, nobody has done this kind of study of the project before, at least not without being connected to the project somehow. There are two MSc. theses¹⁵ on the project, but only considering wildlife in different aspects, and both at the beginning of the 1990s, that is, ten and twelve years ago. The project has evolved and changed very much since then, and none of them considered NORAD's role and the relationship between the central authorities and SLAMU explicitly. There has been a massive study touching upon most angles (Child & Dalal-Clayton 2001/2003) but it hasn't been printed in its final version yet, which means that I won't have time

¹⁵ Dora Ernest Ndhlovu (1990) "Management and utilization of wildlife in Upper Lupande Game Management Area, Luangwa Valley" and Poul Wisborg (1992) "Social and cultural aspects of Wildlife management in Africa" both from the Agricultural University of Norway, Ås. C. Butler (1996) "The development of ecotourism in South Luangwa National Park, Zambia" and C. Wainwright (1996) "Evaluating community based natural resource management: a case study of the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project, Zambia" both from the University of Kent, UK.

to look at it before this study is finished. From what I have understood, they don't focus on NORAD's work in general and not on CBD's role.

The project will be presented further below in part 1.3 and also in chapter 2. The theories and research methods will be presented more thoroughly in chapter 3.

1.3 Suitability of the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project/South Luangwa Area Management Unit as a Case Study

As stated before, I'm going to look at the SLAMU project and particularly at the community-programme, to illustrate the investments in sustainable development by Norway through NORAD in co-operation with Zambia. Since it is supposed to be a successful project combining environment and development, it should be well suited for this study. The project is based on the concept of Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) and it is a kind of continuance of the CAMPFIRE¹⁶ project in Zimbabwe. According to Inger Næss, Adviser for Southern Africa at NORAD, SLAMU is even more successful than CAMPFIRE (Næss 2001: [interview]). The SLAMU project was one of the first programmes to recognise the linkages between poverty and wildlife conservation (Child & Dalal-Clayton 2001: 2).

The underlying assumption was that the local economy could be built around the wildlife sector (ibid.) SLAMU is hopefully a so called "win-win" project, which means that it is supposed to lead to a better life for the poor people in the Luangwa Valley *and* better living conditions for the wildlife in the area – in other words, considering both development and environment. To be able to make the research questions fruitful, I have to concentrate on some issues within SLAMU and ask some concrete and relatively narrow questions. Since Norwegian assistance has two basic concerns, as noted earlier – poverty alleviation and empowerment – and these are main goals of SLAMU, we have to look at how these goals can be reached. According to Grøva they can be reached through two sections of SLAMU; the

¹⁶ CAMPFIRE = Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources.

community-programme and through job creation within tourism (Grøva, statement at annual review meeting, 04.07.02). I will choose one and concentrate my questions on the goals and effects of the community programme¹⁷. By answering the following questions, I will be able to say something about the effects in poverty alleviation and empowerment:

- How has the community-programme affected local people?

Or more specifically,

- Which means are being used to empower¹⁸ people through the community programme?

The social goals mentioned above are to be reached through the sustainable use of wildlife resources to make sure that these resources are not decreased or endangered for the aim of securing this part of people's livelihood and future.

The study will be organised as follows:

Chapter 2 Empirical theme

Chapter 3 Theory and research methods

Chapter 4 Analysis

Chapter 5 Conclusions and tentative recommendations

¹⁷ The community programme, CBNRM programme and – section will be used interchangeably throughout the study.

¹⁸ Normally empowerment refers only to social and/or economical aspects in giving people better possibilities to earn what they need and to influence decision-making both locally and nationally. In this case however, empowerment includes the environmental aspect in that people are empowered to take better care of the natural resources in their area. That way it is an empowerment especially in accordance with Sustainable Development (See 2.1).

2. Empirical theme; the sustainable use of natural resources in rural development through Aid, Decentralisation/CBNRM and international conventions.

2.1 Introduction

The empirical theme involves efforts on three levels, international through conventions and bilateral development co-operation, national through the government and Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), and local through ZAWA/SLAMU with the CBNRM component. First, some background information on Zambia in general will be given. The next part will be background information on the international process focusing on the connection between environment and development and the two chosen conventions. In the third part, Norwegian national strategies and follow ups of the conventions in the development co-operation by NORAD will be presented. Finally, in the last part of the chapter, a more thorough presentation of the case study project will be given.

2.1.1 Zambia's political, economic and social development situation

To be able to understand the circumstances that SLAMU is set within, a short introduction to the political, economical, and social development situation in Zambia is important. From being one of Africa's most prosperous countries thirty years ago, Zambia has turned into one of the poorest (NORAD 2001: 7). A reason for this is the decline in the international copper market since the end of the 1970s, on which the one-sided economic policy of Zambia was focused (Sele 2002). The reforms which were initiated after the first multi-party election in 1991, have been inconsistently implemented and have lacked the wanted effects. Gradually, political and economic development has stagnated, and the provision of public services like education, health services, and clean water have also deteriorated (NORAD 2001:6-7). One of the main

reasons for this is that the dual governance system on local level is dysfunctional (Crook & Manor 2001:2). Urban and District Councils have major financial problems, due to the fact that they only receive an average of between one and three per cent of their total funds from central government (ibid.). They have also been deprived of former powers to mobilise resources, which lead to inability in service delivery to local people. The implications for popular confidence in government are severe, and something needs to be done to change this negative trend. This will be discussed in chapter 4.

The country's ranking on the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) is now down to 153rd place, and eighty-five per cent of the people live on less than a dollar a day¹⁹. Most indicators reveal a more precarious situation in rural than in urban areas (NORAD 2001: 7). According to the national newspaper *The Post*, (June 2002), fifty per cent of the National Budget is donor-funded, something which shows how dependent the country is on development co-operation. Norway provides about five per cent of the total donor funding to Zambia (NORAD 2001: 10).

2.2 Historical background, development and understanding of the concept Sustainable Development (SD).

“Around the globe political leaders and public administrators routinely justify policies, projects, and initiatives in terms of the contribution they make to realising sustainable development”. (Lafferty & Meadowcroft 2000: 1).

The first time the Sustainable Development concept was used was in the World Conservation Strategy (WCS) in 1980. The WCS also provided the first comprehensive, integrated strategy to conserve wild species and habitats. It was commissioned by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and formulated by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources/The World Conservation Union (IUCN) in collaboration with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). The WCS was launched in 30 countries, and it explains the contribution of living resource conservation to human survival and to sustainable

development. It identifies the priority conservation issues and the main requirements for dealing with them²⁰.

Sustainable development as a concept achieved new status with the publication of *Our Common Future (OCF)*, the report of The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)²¹ in 1987. The UN General Assembly appointed the WCED as an independent body in 1983. It was composed of 21 commissioners with representation equally divided between developed and developing countries. In the enabling resolution, the general assembly called on the Commission to propose long-term environmental strategies for achieving sustainable development to the year 2000 and beyond (Lafferty and Meadowcroft: 2000). It has gained more and more attention, especially because of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, and many countries are now adopting conservation strategies formulated within the guidelines suggested in all these documents on Sustainable Development (Reid 1997: xiii, <http://www.batcon.org/batsmag/v1n1-10.html>).

The idea Sustainable Development (SD) was central to the whole UNCED process and is explicitly mentioned among other places in the text of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), but the concept was never formally defined in any of the UNCED documents, its meaning was taken for granted from *Our Common Future* (Lafferty & Meadowcroft: 2000). My understanding of Sustainable Development is mainly taken from Lafferty and Meadowcroft (2000), with supplements from Lafferty & Langhelle (Eds: 1999), their presentation of other authors' views, and the understanding of the concept from *Our Common Future*. Many prefer to restrict the concept to environmental sustainability (Meadowcroft in Lafferty & Langhelle 1999: 13), especially in the Western world. It is important to emphasise that the concept is here understood as more than environmental sustainability – even though that will be a main part of this study. The reason why the environment is emphasised here, is its

¹⁹ Human Development Report (HDR) (1999), UNDP.

²⁰ <http://www.nssd.net/References/KeyDocs/IIEDa24.htm> . Nssd = national strategies for SD. The website is developed and managed by the National Resources Institute (NRI), University of Greenwich and funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID)

minor role in Norwegian aid compared to the two other aspects within Sustainable Development. This understanding involves seeing economic development, social development, and environmental protection as interdependent and mutually reinforcing components (of SD) as it was described in the ‘Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21’ adopted at UNGASS²² in 1997.

“[A]chieving Sustainable Development involves the pursuit of economic, social and environmental goods to enhance the welfare of current and future generations. In particular, this implies reconciling economic advance, social equity, and environmental protection – and neglect of any one of these strands means a drift away from the line of SD” (Lafferty & Meadowcroft 2000: 18).

Alternatively, one can emphasise two sorts of constraints on developmental activity embedded within the notion of Sustainable Development (Lafferty & Meadowcroft: 2000).

First, there are **physical environmental constraints**: beyond a certain point, the erosion of environmental assets will threaten development progress. Thus the maintenance of an adequate environmental base becomes a precondition for making continuing development possible.

Second, there are **ethical constraints** rooted in the imperatives of social justice. It is morally right to have regard for the needs of future persons (inter-generational justice), and to address the pressing needs of the world’s poor (intra-generational justice). These requirements in turn establish limits to the forms of development activity that legitimately can be pursued today (ibid.).

Lafferty (1996) has referred to four normative principles embodied in UNCED’s usage of SD, which is another way of clarifying the concept; change which is to be considered sustainable *development* aims: 1) to satisfy basic human needs and reasonable standards of welfare for **all** living beings and 2) to achieve more equitable standards of living both within and among global populations. To be *sustainable*, change should: 3) be pursued with great caution so as to avoid disruption of **biodiversity** and the regenerative capacity of nature, both locally and globally, and 4)

²¹ Also called the Brundtland Commission, after its leader Gro Harlem Brundtland. The shortenings OCF and WCED will be used interchangeably throughout this study.

²² UNGASS = United Nations General Assembly Special Session

be achieved without undermining the possibility for future generations to attain similar standards of living and similar or improved standards of equity' (ibid: 18-19). These principles are not supposed to be (part of) a definition of Sustainable Development, but rather function as a specification of the normative dimensions included in the concept (Lafferty 1996: 19). According to Lafferty & Meadowcroft (2000: 19) all successful and indicative concepts invoked in political life are subject to contrasting interpretations and are loaded with different meanings. They continue:

Divergence of understanding and usage is especially likely with highly charged normative concepts, such as 'democracy', 'freedom' or 'equality'. The range of understandings hardly prevents, however, the application of such contestable concepts in specific policies and programmes for social and economic change" (ibid.).

For this study, it is sufficient to take notice of the fact that Sustainable Development indicates an interdependent concern with: promoting human welfare; satisfying basic needs; protecting the environment; considering the fate of future generations; achieving equity between rich and poor; and participating on a broad basis in development decision-making.

2.2.1 Basis from 'Our Common Future' by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED).

The WCED (1987: 21) recommended putting the problem of endangered species and ecosystems on the political agenda as an important issue in the debate on economy and resources. There are many good reasons for this; the diversity of species is necessary for the normal functioning of ecosystems and the biosphere as a whole, the genetic material contributes billions of dollars yearly in the form of improved crop species, new drugs and medicines and raw material for industry. Besides utility issues, there are also moral, ethical, cultural, aesthetic and purely scientific reasons for conserving biodiversity (ibid, Swanson 1997). Although the cost of conservation will rise - both directly and in terms of opportunities for development foregone - long-term the development possibilities will increase, which is a very important point to clarify. For these reasons, international development agencies should give comprehensive and systematic attention to the problems and

opportunities of species conservation (1987: 13,147). The WCED-report maintains that managing species and ecosystems together is clearly the most rational way to approach the problem. At the heart of the issue lies the fact that there is often a conflict between the short-term economic interest of individual nations and the long-term interest of Sustainable Development and potential economic gains of the world community at large. A major thrust in action to conserve genetic diversity must therefore be directed at making it more economically attractive both in the short term and in the longer perspective to protect wild species and their ecosystems.

Developing countries must be ensured an equitable share of the economic profit from the use of genes for commercial purposes. I will maintain that it might be most important to show that there is much to be gained in implementing sustainable development (policies) also for a single country, not just the world community at large, instead of going after short-term economic profit, which can ruin or decrease the basis for further development (Paavola: 2002). If the authorities and citizens in a developing country realises that they can secure their *own* development basis by going for sustainable development, I think there is a greater chance that it will be put on the political agenda rather than if one just focuses on the world community as a whole.

A lot of people who live in developing countries have expressed concern and fear that the industrialised countries will limit or stop their development by claiming that they have to take the environment into consideration. It is entirely understandable that they are afraid that we will try to limit their development possibilities so that we can go on living in our luxury. It is therefore very important to express that it is to secure their own development that environmental considerations have to be taken, and that they must not do the same mistakes that we have done in our industrialisation, or so called grey growth. The knowledge the industrial countries have gained must be transferred, to secure that it doesn't take as long for the developing countries to go from a grey to a green development (Berntsen: 2001). This is in accordance with WCED, which states that industrial nations should support the efforts of Third World nations to conserve species, which would be part of a green growth. Industrial nations

should also seek ways to help developing nations realise some of the economic benefits of these resources (1987: 157).

A new approach is of anticipation and prevention is needed. With the development politics which is lead these days, species will go extinct (ibid.). There have been some improvements since the WCED-report came out, one example is the development of national conservation strategies (NCS), which is supposed to bring the processes of conservation and development together. In connecting with the CSD in Johannesburg, several countries have developed NCSs. Hence, it seems logical that the development of national conservation strategies should be supported through Norwegian development co-operation, but according to Ås (2001: [interview]) NORAD is currently not supporting any developing countries in this respect. He says that it is the developing countries themselves who decide what they want to seek support for and that NORAD has not received any requests for support to development of NCS. However, The Ministry of the Environment follows up the special environmental agreements with a few developing countries where the financial means come from the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD, and support is given to increase the recipient country's competence on environmental issues (Nåvik: Jan. 2003 [e-mail]).

2.2.2 The development of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

There is a growing recognition that biological diversity is of tremendous value for present and future generations, at the same time as the extinction rate of species and ecosystems has never been greater. These recognitions lead UNEP to convene an ad hoc working group of experts on biological diversity in 1988 (<http://www.biodiv.org/conv/background.html>). It was to evaluate the need for an international convention on biological diversity. In 1989, an ad hoc working group of technical and legal experts (later called 'Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee') prepared an international legal instrument for conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity – the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). It was opened for signature at UNCED, in Rio de Janeiro on the 5th of June 1992, and remained

open until the 29th of December 1993 when it entered into force as a legally binding agreement after 168 states had signed and 30 had ratified it. 182 states are now parties to the CBD²³.

The objectives of the Convention as they are stated in article 1 are:

” ... the conservation of biological diversity, *the sustainable use of its components* and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding”.

The convention also encourages all governments in the world to make national action plans for sustainable use and conservation of biological diversity and for all developed countries to take (specific) measures to help developing nations in fulfilling their obligations to the Convention. Several of the articles are related to the special needs of developing countries.²⁴ Article 20 (4) is especially relevant to this study, it says:

“4. The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under this Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under this Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account the fact that *economic and social development and eradication of poverty are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties*” (my italicization).

2.2.3 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species Of Wild Fauna And Flora (CITES.)

The aim of CITES is to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival. In the 1960s, at the time when the ideas of CITES were first formed, international discussion of the regulation of wildlife trade for conservation purposes was something relatively new (<http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml>).

International wildlife trade is estimated to be worth billions of dollars annually, and to include hundreds of millions of plant and animal specimens. The trade is

²³ By January 2002, including Norway and Zambia.

²⁴ Article 16 (2), 17 (1), 18 (2), 19 (1) and (2), 20 (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7), (1) and 21. See appendix 1 for relevant parts of the Convention text.

diverse, ranging from live animals and plants to a vast array of wildlife products derived from them. Levels of exploitation of some animal and plant species are high and the trade in them, together with other factors, such as habitat loss, is capable of heavily depleting their populations, even bringing some species close to extinction (ibid.). Many wildlife species in trade are not endangered, but the existence of an agreement to ensure the sustainability of the trade is considered important in order to safeguard these resources for the future.

Because the trade in wild animals and plants crosses borders between countries, the effort to regulate it requires international co-operation to safeguard certain species from over-exploitation. CITES was drafted as a result of a resolution adopted in 1963 at a meeting of members of IUCN (The World Conservation Union). The text of the Convention²⁵ was finally agreed at a meeting of representatives of 80 countries in Washington DC, USA, on the 3rd of March 1973. On the 1st of July 1975 CITES entered into force. CITES is an international agreement to which States adhere voluntarily. Although the convention is legally binding on the Parties - in other words they have to implement the Convention - it does not take the place of national laws. Rather it provides a framework to be respected by each Party, which has to adopt its own domestic legislation to make sure that CITES is implemented at the national level.

According to the CITES official website, not one species protected by the convention has become extinct as a result of trade since it entered into force and it is among the largest conservation agreements in existence, with now over 150 Parties (<http://www.cites.org>).

2.3 Norwegian national strategies

NORAD employees relate to many strategies, some overarching and others as follow up on more specific issues, but they all touch upon Sustainable Development and environmental factors. As noted in chapter 1, the most overarching for the whole

²⁵ <http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml>

organisation is “NORAD invests in the future - NORAD's strategy for 2000 - 2005”²⁶, which gives an overall presentation of NORAD's work and indicates the kind of development it wants to support. The whole strategy and the parts²⁷ which are most relevant for the approach to the problem of integrating environment will be elaborated on in chapter 4. There is also report no. 19 to the Storting (1995-96) “A changing world – Main elements of Norwegian policy towards developing countries”, “The Strategy for environmental development co-operation (1997-2005), “HIV/AIDS and development - Norway’s views”, “NORAD's Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Action Plan”, report no. 21 to the Storting (1999-2000) “Action plan for human rights”, NORAD's “Handbook in Human Rights Assessment”, and “Strategy for female- and equal rights oriented development co-operation”. In addition there are strategic guidelines from the foreign Ministry in the yearly allocation letters.

As also mentioned in chapter 1, in addition to the main strategy, I have chosen to take a closer look at the two strategies which are most relevant for environmental development co-operation, according to employees in the Unit for Environment and Energy (Ås: 2002 [interview and e-mail], Opsal: 2002 [interview]). These are Report no.19 to the Storting (1995-96) “A changing world– Main elements of Norwegian policy towards developing countries” and “The Strategy for Environmental Development Co-operation” (SEDC).

2.3.1 Report no.19 to the Storting (1995-96) “A changing world –Main elements of Norwegian policy towards developing countries”.

There are often trend changes in all areas of society, so also in politics. Right after the publication of the Brundtland-report in 1987, sustainable development was a ‘new’ and exciting concept, which was considered very important as a goal for development, globally as well as locally. This can also be seen in the Report no. 19 to the Storting from 1995-96, where it is said that the superior goal for Norwegian south politics is to contribute to the improvement of economic, social and political

²⁶ This strategy will be called ‘the main strategy’ in the following.

²⁷ The relevant parts for environmental development work are a description of sustainability and a description of the work on environment and natural resources (pp11 and 21)

circumstances in the developing countries within the framework of sustainable development (Report no. 19 (1995-96): 6 and 11).

There are 5 main points under this superior goal; 1. Contribute to promotion of peace, human rights and democracy, 2. Contribute to promotion of economic and social development for poor countries and peoples, 3. Contribute to a responsible management of the environment on earth and its biological diversity, 4. Contribute to promotion of equal rights and possibilities for women and men on all areas in society and 5. Contribute to prevention and alleviation of suffering in connection with conflict situations and natural catastrophes (ibid: 6-7). Point 3 is the most relevant for this case study, but the other points are also pertinent, which will be shown in the analysis. It also says in the strategy that the government wants to strengthen the work on integration of environmental issues in the development co-operation in general. The integration of environment and development on all levels of decision making has been a goal of NORAD for about 20 years (Opsal, Ås 2002 [interviews], Skjønberg: 2000). Additionally, it is mentioned that a strategy for environmental development co-operation should be worked out. The strategy was finished in 1997 after 10 years of planning and discussions (Andersen: 2001 [personal comment]).

2.3.2 The Strategy for Environmental Development Co-operation (SEDC)

Point number 3 under the main goal of Report no. 19 mentioned above – Contribution to a responsible management of the environment on earth and the biological diversity – is the superior goal of the Strategy for Environmental Development Co-operation. This point is made more concrete with four prioritised areas; 1. Development of sustainable production systems, 2. Conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 3. Reduced pollution of earth, air and water, and 4. Cultural heritage protection and management of the natural environment's cultural values. The goal for environmental development co-operation is further to integrate environmental considerations in all development co-operation supported by Norway (SEDC: 1).

To be able to integrate environmental considerations in all development co-operation it is important to; secure that environmental considerations are incorporated in strategies for individual aid areas, secure that environmental considerations are sufficiently regarded in decisions on separate projects, secure sufficient environmental competence and capacity in NORAD, training of personnel (NORAD and Foreign Ministry) and lastly, strengthen contact with and use of the environmental expertise network in Norway.

Another aspect in SEDC is the role of global conventions on environmental issues, which also encompass developmental aspects, making it imperative to secure the best possible conformity between obligations in the conventions, and regulations in development co-operation politics (ibid: 4). Other aspects that are relevant for this study is the emphasis on participation (ibid: 5), that poverty orientation shall be the basis for the environmental development co-operation, and that the biological diversity's national and local importance for livelihood and future development possibilities will be of the greatest influence. In the last aspect, it is argued that aid capital funds can play a significant role. Under implementation of the strategic regulations it says that ventures which are not directly environmentally oriented should be not contribute unnecessarily to environmental problems (ibid: 11). Lastly, on preparation of country strategies in bilateral development co-operation, SEDC says that environmental circumstances shall be given more weight. The strategy refers to the connections with other areas within development work: social and economic development, health, water supply and sanitation, civil society and (local) participation, institutional capacity, education and competence building, business, industry, the role of women, gender equality, infrastructure development, migration, agriculture and fisheries.

To conclude, my impressions are that people on the outside, either former NORAD employees or people who co-operate with or evaluate NORAD's performance, and the NORAD employees working especially with environmental issues, find that the above mentioned goals largely have not been reached. Employees in the regional offices on the other hand, find that sustainable development as such has been integrated in their work, and that it therefore doesn't need political follow up

anymore. There are several things that could have been done to get closer to these goals but, as long as the apprehensions and interpretations are so essentially different, they are difficult to implement. I will have a closer look at this in chapter 4.

2.4 Decentralised management of natural resources as a means in rural development – specifically community-based natural resource management (CBNRM).

2.4.1 *Historical background; Colonial history*

Many of Africa's national parks date back to colonial times. The first international conservation treaty²⁸, which was signed in London in 1900 by all the continent's colonial powers²⁹, laid the foundation for the top-down preservationist style of management that came to characterise African conservation policies (Honey, 1999: 223). However, very few species were completely protected and big game hunting was permitted and even encouraged for some species³⁰ that were considered threats to settler farming (ibid.). But hunting required a licence, which Africans could not obtain or afford, neither were they allowed to own rifles. Pre-colonial management of wildlife resources was under the control of local chiefs, but with the colonisation local communities were disenfranchised (Munyenyembe et. al. 2000: 61); hunting in Africa became solely a sport of the European aristocracy. Africans' traditional practices of killing animals only for food, ritual use or self-protection were banned, forcing them to become poachers (Honey 1999: 23). The reason was that the colonialists feared that the Africans would wipe out the continent's wildlife. But, already by 1900, it was conclusively shown that it was the white intruders, not the indigenous people, who were most swiftly and systematically killing off Africa's wildlife (ibid.)

With the transition into postcolonial time, independent states had other more pressing priorities than wildlife, and the ideology was almost unaltered (ibid: 225, Munyenyembe et. al 2000: 61). The conservation organisations, like WWF and

²⁸ The Convention for the Preservation of Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa.

²⁹ Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Belgium.

³⁰ Like lion, leopard and wild dogs.

IUCN, replicated the top-down, repressive practices of colonial rule together with elites, which mostly ignored the needs of local communities and often denied them access to ancestral homelands (Honey 1999: 226). Indeed, protected areas have been the source of many conflicts due to the associated loss of rights, or access, to the range of biological resources necessary for local livelihoods (Koziell & Saunders 2000: 6). In the 1950s with the realisation that there was a potential for tourism in many areas, it was also realised that change was needed (Munyenyembe et. al 2000). In addition, the protected areas approach has its limitations, not only because of potential conflicts and pressures as the demands for material development have grown, but also because the viability of species populations held within such areas declines as they become isolated (ibid.). Therefore, protected areas alone cannot be used to maintain a representative sample of biodiversity, because most of the diversity will always be in areas also populated by people.

All of these realisations eventually led to the Community-based Natural Resource Management initiatives in many of the Southern African countries³¹(Child:2002 [interview]). Child emphasised that it was a Southern African idea; it did not come from donors (ibid.). The development of CBNRM was partly a reaction to the centralised systems from colonial times and represented a new, very different way of managing natural resources. It also contains the realisation that the conservation of natural resources is by extension the conservation of human life, and that the conservation of culture rests on conservation of nature (Stenseth 1999: 97). In addition, this approach is connected to Sustainable Development in that one main condition for reaching SD is to make sure that the Earth's biological diversity is not emaciated (ibid: 98).

2.4.2 *Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM).*

The principles of CBRNM were the background for LIRD and later on, a CBRNM component – a community programme³² – was established within the

³¹ Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia. Just to mention it, CBNRM projects are also being used in other parts of the world, among other places in Asia and Latin America.

³² Community programme and CBNRM section will be used interchangeably throughout the study.

project to strengthen the local participation. As mentioned above, the fact that CBNRM was ‘invented’ can be seen as a response to dysfunctional centralised management, which was a legacy of the colonial time. Until the 1970’s wildlife conservation was solely the state’s responsibility (Hutton: 1996). However, policies imposed by government agencies often don’t succeed, because they cannot control all users of living natural resources, as is the case with many rural populations who depend on natural resources for their survival (IUCN 2002: 183).

In projects based on community-based natural resource management, the responsibility is devolved to the local level. The local level is defined differently in different projects and programmes. In the CAMPFIRE project in Zimbabwe, it is generally the local governments that get the responsibility, whilst in Zambia it goes all the way down to villagers through Village Action Groups (VAGs). It has been organised in this way in Zambia partly because the district councils and line ministries are very weak (Chimba 2002 [interview], Larsen 2002 [interview], Crook & Manor 2002). The idea is that people will be given incentives to live with and conserve wildlife when they get direct benefits from it, by receiving revenues from hunting and photo safaris and from entrance fees to the National Park (IUCN:2000, Boje:2000). This means that the community programme in SLAMU and other similar projects, all based on CBNRM, attempt to both enhance development and conserve biodiversity at the same time. The different projects have been rooted in different problems – ADMADE³³ and LIRD/SLAMU in serious poaching and with a heavy focus on wildlife, whilst CAMPFIRE was rooted in land pressure, and the LIFE project in Namibia had social empowerment of marginalized groupings as the initial impetus (Munyenembe et. al: 2000) There are, however some who are opposed to this kind of decentralisation. The arguments for and against decentralisation of responsibility for natural resources, will be further discussed and analysed in chapter 4.

³³ The Administrative Management Design (ADMAD) first called Lupande development project, is the other CBNRM pilot project next to LIRD which became SLAMU. Both grew out of the Lupande Development Workshop which was held in 1983.

2.5 Specific empirical case: the LIRD/SLAMU in Zambia.

2.5.1 The project area in the Luangwa Valley




Figure 2.1 The project area

As can be seen in the map above, **the LIRD/SLAMU area** covers the South Luangwa National Park (SLNP) and the Lupande Game Management Area (LGMA) which totals 14.000 square kilometres³⁴. There were 28.000 people living in the area in 1987, and the last number is estimated at 50.000 people (WWF Land Use planning team 2002 [workshop]).

The Luangwa Valley was and still is a relatively poor area³⁵. It is situated outside the Copper belt/'line-of-rail' provinces, where economic activity was concentrated from colonial time. This created vast regional inequality after independence, and education and other social infrastructure were also largely neglected (Andersson et. al.11: 2000). The eastern province still suffers from this lack of equal treatment especially concerning poorly developed infrastructure, health care and schools. There has nevertheless been substantial migration to the area since the project became known because people hope there will be jobs for them on the project (Mwamba 2002 [interview], Lubilo 2002 [interview]). The villages have grown and there are more and more individual initiatives in setting up small shops which sell groceries and local curios (land use planning facility WWF, presentation at Workshop: 2002).

The SLNP was created in 1972 when all game reserves were converted to national parks. It had been a game reserve since the early part of the century and has become internationally known for its exceptional wildlife. Tourism potential was realised in the 1950s when pontoon crossings were established across the Luangwa river and the first camps and lodges opened (ibid: 3). After independence in 1964, conservation issues in the area became a major concern, it lead to the establishment of the Luangwa Valley Conservation and development Project (1968-1973) funded by UNDP/FAO³⁶, which undertook surveys and concluded that there were too many

³⁴ The SLNP covers about 9050 km², and the LGMA 4800 km².

³⁵ There are different ways of defining poverty. Earlier it was often considered as notions of inadequate private income or consumption, but in the so-called 'new poverty agenda' it has been broadened towards a more comprehensive perspective where poverty is defined as absence of a secure and sustainable livelihood (Mikkelsen 1995:149). The broadened definition is easier to connect with defining a poor area, since it stresses the importance of access to goods and services. It is important for people to have access, since it will be difficult for them to improve their standard of living without it. In this case a poor area means that there is a lack of infrastructure, like (all-weather) roads and health care, and also low quality on the existing services (health care and schools). Housing is also low standard, with even people working for SLAMU(who are considered fortunate) living in tiny tin huts.

³⁶ United Nations Development Program and Food and Agriculture Organisation

elephants³⁷ who were destroying forests and degrading habitat (ibid.) This project also foresaw the need for a tourism industry and they began constructing the infrastructure that would be needed. It included 40 km of all weather roads in the park, a bridge across the Luangwa River at Mfuwe, several smaller bridges which allowed access to Chipata all year round and last but not least, a new airport (ibid.).

2.5.2 The different phases of the Project³⁸.

The preparatory phase of the project was initiated with a workshop in 1983 and ended with the formal establishment of LIRD in May 1986 (LIRD project document no. 4, Oct. 1987). NORAD financed some of the preparatory work and decided to formally co-operate with the Zambian government on the project in 1988, after four years of considerations and numerous letters of application from the Zambian President (Larsen: 2002 [interview]). The financial agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Zambia was finally signed in 1989 for a 4-year second phase (ibid., LIRD project documents(NORAD archive)). Since then there has been two years of transition (1993-94) before the third phase started in 1995. It was extended with one year and thus ended in 1998, and phase 4 started in 1999 and ends this year. This was supposed to be the last phase, as phase III was meant to be from the beginning, but the SLAMU management is currently working on the application for another five year phase.

The most important events in the history of the project will be described in the next section below.

2.5.3 Former and new organisation

The first model was based on the ideas from a workshop in 1983, which was further developed by the Norwegian biologist Thor S. Larsen in collaboration with the Zambian Fidelis B. Lungu. The most important part of their ideas was the use of the full range of natural resources to improve the standard of living for the people of the Luangwa Valley. They considered the local government as being too weak and

³⁷ About 90'000 elephants in the entire Luangwa basin.

³⁸ For a full description of the different phases, See Child & Dalal-Clayton (2001/2003) final draft and forthcoming study of LIRD/SLAMU from IIED.

not innovative enough to handle the assignment, and therefore based it outside all official government as a project on its own (Larsen: 2002 [interview]). The idea was although from the beginning that the administration of the different activities would be gradually transferred into the regular administrative system of Zambia (Agreement between Norway and Zambia: 1989).

Initially, the chiefs were seen as representative agents/distributors for the local people and collaboration was started with them. The chiefs appointed the highest level of Community-based organisations (CBOs) in the beginning; the Area Development Committees (ADCs). These had the responsibility to travel to the different areas and appoint people to form the next level of CBOs; Village Action Groups (VAGs), in the different areas in the Southern part of the Luangwa Valley. The chiefs made themselves heads of the ADCs, but this was changed after a while due to the necessity of auditing the ADCs. The traditional role of the chiefs makes it impossible to audit them, and therefore they could not continue as heads of ADCs. The chiefs' participation was further reduced when elections were introduced instead of chiefs appointing people, which made the CBOs much more democratic and better founded in the villages. This was done to make the system more transparent and to hinder corruption, which was a problem in the beginning.

Another weakness in the system was the lack of transparency regarding the use of money. There was no proper budgeting and things got out of hand, which ultimately lead to reorganisation. The exceptional component in the CBNRM programme after the reorganisation is the radical bottom-up approach (Boje: 2000:10). The differences in organisation can be seen in figure 2.2 below.




Figure 2.2 Old and new policy and organisation.

At the lowest level in the triangle, villages are represented by Village Action Groups (VAGs). The VAGs are small democratic institutions which have a much larger role after the reorganisation, because they receive the major part of the wildlife revenue, and here all decisions lie entirely with the community members (Chimba 2002: [interview], Boje: 2000). There are 43 VAGs in the project area and there are about 500 members in each. At chiefdom level there is an Area Development Committee (ADC) responsible for co-ordinating, monitoring and reporting (ibid.). Some of their work involves maintaining a bank account and financial records, monitoring the VAG performance and financial records, and co-ordinating development plans for their area (Boje:2000:7). As can be seen from figure 2.2, in the old policy the chiefs were in control of the wildlife money and from the beginning they appointed themselves heads of the ADCs, whilst within the new policy they have a non-administrative and non-executive role, being patrons and overall advisors.

Lastly, SLAMU was focused on providing infrastructure in the old model, functioning as a mini-government. When it was realised that this became too

expensive and financial self-sustainability was impossible to reach, the policy was changed. In the new policy, SLAMU is to monitor the performance of finances and institutional development of VAGs and ADCs. They also must develop a managerial capacity of community institutions, e.g., provide training and design systems (CBNRM section: 1999, Chimba: 2002 [interview]). This means that SLAMU has changed from a provider of services and infrastructure, to a facilitator of training and technical support, although the goals and the CBNRM policy remained unchanged (ibid.). The money generated by the National Park goes to SLAMU to cover administration costs and salaries while the revenues from safari hunting goes to the communities. Figure 2.3 in appendix 1 shows how the money is shared.

2.5.4 Analysis of the case study project

As most can probably understand from the presentation above, it is very difficult to limit the themes in this study because, as many scientists have come to realise, one species cannot be studied in isolation, but must be analysed within its ecosystem. The same goes for the local project, SLAMU, which should be seen in relation to Zambia's decentralisation strategy as well as be considered in relation to the national political situation and international conventions and agreements, which have influence on the project. In addition, the financing and influence from NORAD should be considered. There are so many societal and cultural aspects that are interdependent, and analysing everything is impossible in a master's degree thesis. To consider some aspects, namely the project's contribution towards Sustainable Development, the institutional influences from contributing institutions/organisations, and some international conventions' effects on the project, is although possible to do without having to consider all other aspects surrounding the project to the same degree. I will look at how the international conventions, CBD and CITES, are known to the employees in SLAMU, and how these affect the project.

Where it is natural and necessary other aspects will be touched upon in explaining the performance of SLAMU's community-programme, but they will have a smaller role than the main aspects mentioned above. I have made some choices after having spoken to a lot of people on different levels, who are or have been working in

NORAD, or are or have been involved in the project. Considering also that despite my broad and interdisciplinary background from different countries, this is a political science thesis.

I have therefore decided to **focus mainly on the institutional and decentralisation aspects of and around the project and the connection to sustainable development** and the international conventions. It will be interesting to see how well management responsibility and resources have actually been devolved to the local level in this case represented by SLAMU, and if this is making the management of the wildlife better and *sustainable*, since that is the theory behind CBNRM and Local Agenda 21 from Rio. The main goal of the project has always been to give the people of the valley a better livelihood through sustainable use of the natural resources. I will look at how the institutional characters of the involved institutions have contributed to or hindered the project in its work for poverty reduction and sustainable use of wildlife. I have chosen to look specifically at these two aspects, poverty reduction and sustainable use of natural resources, which can be seen as components/goals within Sustainable Development, because they are the most relevant in this particular project. Secondly, I have chosen them because they are important goals for NORAD.

It is important to look at the reasons for why the project was organised the way it was, and later how the integration of the project into official authorities is proceeding. The integration process did not start until in phase III, in 1995, and it can be questioned why it didn't start earlier. This happened in conjunction with the scaling down of the project from a mini-government to something that was supposed to be more manageable for both NORAD and the project employees, and to make it easier for the project to become financially self-sustainable. The way LIRD was functioning made it impossible to become financially self-sustainable because it sponsored too many activities, had high expenses and received too little income (Child, Larsen and Lomøy: 2002 [interviews]). The more specific questions I will try to answer in relation to the case study are;

First, on NORAD and institutional features;

- Which institutional features in NORAD play a positive role in making it possible to see the project through?
- And which function as barriers?

Second, on the local case;

- Is the decentralisation to SLAMU/the Community-programme having any effect on local government?
- How is the placement of the project under ZAWA instead of NPWS affecting the decentralisation/the autonomy of SLAMU/the Community-programme?

With the data I collected in the project area, I should be able to answer the questions above with a high degree of certainty, since I have the strategies of SLAMU in general and the community-programme specifically, the interviews of many employees who have been there for a long time, which makes them able to say something about the differences from LIRD to SLAMU and the degree of decentralisation over time. I have also interviewed the former head of the community-programme who has been working with CBNRM questions both within and outside SLAMU, and a ZAWA employee who has been working in SLAMU before, but is now at ZAWA HQ.

3. Theory and research methods

3.1 Theory - introduction

The concept Sustainable Development will be used to shed light on NORAD's strategies and the integration of environmental considerations in development co-operation. This will be done to see how well the strategies and practical work are in accordance with Sustainable Development, since that is seen to be the main goal of the development work. The integration of environment is seen as an implementation problem, because in most strategies for the last 20 years it has been a goal, but there are different opinions as to whether this goal has been reached or not, or to what degree it has been reached (Skjøsberg: 2000, Opsal: 2002 [interview], Ås: 2002 [interview], Lomøy: 2002 [interview], Andersen: 2001 [personal communication]). The theory on decentralisation and the concept community-based natural resource management will be used to analyse the project SLAMU and its relations to NORAD. Institutional aspects will be touched upon within the main theoretical approaches – Sustainable development, implementation theory and decentralisation theory – supported by institutional approaches taken from Peters. The theories are supplementing and there is no clear border between them in real life. The discussions on degree of decentralisation and how to implement measures to reach goals are universal and relevant to all institutions. Within NORAD there is also a focus on centralisation versus decentralisation when it comes to decision authority and responsibility, and within SLAMU implementation problems are discussed. Therefore, an eclectic approach will be used, which means that the most relevant parts of the different theories will be used in the analysis.

The recommendations from *Our common future* and Lafferty & Meadowcrofts³⁹ contributions on Sustainable Development have influenced my research questions and function as a basis for the entire analysis.

³⁹ See 2.1.

3.1.1 Decentralisation Theory/ Community-based Development Theory⁴⁰

For more than four decades, optimistic colonial powers, newly independent countries, and Western aid agencies have sought to assist the governments of late developing countries to formulate, adopt, and implement decentralisation reforms and programmes – these have mainly failed (Cohen & Peterson 1999: 1)

SLAMU is seen as a decentralisation project by many, including Child (2002 [interview]) who thinks it is a fantastic decentralisation experiment which can have far-reaching effects. For this reason, I will analyse the project using decentralisation theory from theorists who have developed their contributions especially considering developing countries, mainly Ribot (& Agrawal) (1999 & 2002), but with contributions from Braathen (2002), Cohen & Peterson (1999) and Rondinelli (1999). Ribot's contributions are especially relevant since he considers the decentralisation of natural resource management. One thing that can be seen as a problem, is that the theories mainly focus on formal government and administration units, whereas the project at least as long as it was called LIRD, was an autonomous unit outside the formal governance system (Larsen: 2002 [interview], ZAM 044 archive documents, NORAD). In addition, Community-based Organisations (CBOs) have been established as autonomous bodies outside the formal governance system. However, theories developed to explain formal government can, in some cases, be extended so that they are applicable to other types of governance. In fact, some have wide definitions of democracy, development of democratic principles and decentralisation, and refer to traditional structures and CBOs in their writings on district democracy (Siame: 2000, Braathen: 2000, FODEP: 99-00).

Decentralisation is defined as the transfer of power and resources from the central to a lower level of an organisation, or as ceding of powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy (Braathen 2002:22, Ribot 2002: v). Rondinelli (1999:2) on the other hand, has a wider definition of decentralisation; “[..] the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to subordinate or quasi-independent government

⁴⁰ The reason why these two approaches have been placed together is because decentralisation theory in general is the ideological basis for the more specific community-based development theory. The latter is very important for the case study project in Zambia, because it is the basis for the community programme's CBNRM-policy.

organisations or the private sector”. The problem with this and other definitions by Rondinelli is that he fails to define what he means by quasi-independent, quasi-autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, if they are the same, overlapping, or entirely different types. This makes it difficult for others to use his definitions – for research to be widely applicable; it needs to be thoroughly defined.

It is also important to distinguish between administrative and political decentralisation: According to Braathen (2002) and Eriksen et. al. (1999) the administrative type of decentralisation is deconcentration, with decision-making power and resources transferred to local civil servants, although consultation with local stakeholders or user groups might be part of the routines. Devolution is defined as the political type of decentralisation, with more power and resources transferred to local elected entities, e.g. the territorially defined local councils (Eriksen et. al: 1999 in Braathen: 2002). Ribot’s definition of devolution is much wider; “any transfer from central government to any non-central-government body – including local elected governments, NGOs, customary authorities, private bodies etc”. (2002: v). His definition of political or democratic decentralisation is basically the same as the one given by Braathen and Eriksen et. al, although it is explained in further detail (ibid.). Ribot also has a separate category for delegation, and it is defined as “the transfer of public functions to lower levels of government, public corporations or any other authorities outside the regular political-administrative structure to implement programs on behalf of a government agency” (ibid.).

Rondinelli has yet another categorisation, political decentralisation is not really defined, but he says something about its aims and what its advocates assume (see 1999:2), which is not very different from any of the other scholars’ definitions. Administrative decentralisation however, is divided into three sub-types; Deconcentration, devolution and delegation (ibid: 2-3). Cohen & Peterson (1999:22) have the same categorisation of administrative decentralisation, whilst their definition of political decentralisation includes transfer of decision-making power to citizens or their elected representatives.

Many frameworks have been used to analyse African decentralisations⁴¹. One of them which is especially relevant for this study, because it is used to analyse decentralisation of natural resources, is the one developed by Ribot and Agrawal (1999 in Ribot: 2002b) called the ‘actors, powers and accountability framework’. The basic elements of this framework for analysis are the local *actors* involved, the *powers* they hold and the *accountability* relations in which they are embedded (Ribot 2002b: 16). This will be elaborated on in chapter 4, where the project case SLAMU and its underlying CBNRM-programme with co-operating organisations will be analysed using the framework and the other theoretical contributions mentioned above. This will be done to see if these institutional arrangements can really be considered a decentralisation venture from a theoretical point of view, and to categorise this to be able to discern how extensive the decentralisation is.

According to Crook and Sverrisson (1999: 6) one can measure the responsiveness of a decentralised institution by assessing the levels and quality of participation when participation is a goal of decentralisation. It is important from a democratic point of view that the responsiveness is considered, to be able to say something about the projects’ contribution towards empowering of local people. This is also important because increased participation is a goal, both for SLAMU and for NORAD. The participation can be either 1) representative government, 2) direct participation at the community or project level or 3) mobilisation from above. These three forms can be combined in various ways (ibid: 7). In practice it is difficult to completely separate the forms of decentralisation, because they affect one another. One illustrative example from Cohen and Peterson (1999: 23-24) is that while administrative decentralisation is not the same as political decentralisation, it can under enlightened central leadership lead to democratisation and greater political participation.

The Community-based Natural Resource Management approach, which is the ideological basis of LIRD/SLAMU, can be seen as a practically oriented and specialised sub-type of decentralisation. The principles are listed in the box below.

⁴¹ Olowu 2001, Crook and Sverrisson 2001, Crook and Manor 1999, World Bank 2000, Balogun 2000, Conyers 1984, 1990, 1999, 2000, Cohen and Peterson 1997. For more examples see Ribot 2002a.

Community-based Natural Resource Management Principles

- 1) Producer community** – The unit of production should be the unit of management and benefit.
- 2) Scale** – Producer communities should be small enough that all households can participate face-to-face.
- 3) Accountability** – Community corporate bodies should be accountable to their constituency.
- 4) Decentralisation** – Functions should be conducted at the lowest appropriate level.
- 5) Production responsiveness** – The link between production and benefit should be transparent and immediate.
- 6) The right of choice** – Communities must have full choice in the use of wildlife revenues, including household cash
- 7) Commercial devolution** – All marketing should be open and competitive and should be done by the wildlife producers themselves.
- 8) Differential taxation** – The rates of taxation of wildlife should be similar to that of other resources.
- 9) Sustained capacity** – Activities or investment should not be undertaken unless they can be managed and sustained locally.
- 10) Government's responsibility** – Government is ultimately responsible for wildlife but can best achieve societies' goals by devolving authority, operational management and benefit within an enabling framework while maintaining direction with the minimum essential regulation.
- 11) Process** – Devolving authority and developing community management capacity is a process.
- 12) Co-management** – Co-management is necessary, especially in the shift from central to community management systems.

(Munyenye et. al. 2000: 102).

I will not use these principles to evaluate SLAMU because that has already been done by Munyenye et. al. The principles will be touched upon in relation to the more general contributions of decentralisation theory mentioned above, when analysing SLAMU and the CBOs. Is SLAMU an administrative (deconcentration) or political (devolution) type of decentralisation? What about the CBOs SLAMU co-operates with? As mentioned, I wish to look closer at this in the analysis.

3.1.2 Implementation theory - Decision oriented and process oriented approaches

Implementation as a concept is characterised by a basic duality (Kjellberg & Reitan 1995: 132). To implement is both to carry through and to make real. To carry

through a policy does not necessarily mean realisation/fulfilment of its (original) goal (Lane 1992:91 in *ibid.*). The starting point for all implementation researchers is that implementation of a policy or the realisation of a plan, neither follows automatically, nor is guaranteed in any way (*ibid.*: 137) There are two main methodologies within implementation theory; Decision-oriented and Process-oriented approaches. To get an overview, the main difference between them can be set up in a simple figure:

	Decision-oriented	Process-oriented
Main focus on	Central control, hierarchy, formality,	Local action, equality, learning, political processes
Definition of implementation	narrow: the Phase between central resolution and local operationalisation	Wide: in theory the whole political and administrative process
Arenas for implementation	Administrative processes	Political processes
Empirical basis	Authoritative resolution (law or equivalent) about public ventures.	The processes in connection with specific target groups/problem areas; the resolution as part of its surroundings.
Organisational frame	Stabile structures, formal authority relations	Non-formal structures, special networks between equal actors.
Understanding of governance elements	Control, direct influence of underlying units	No clear governance elements; adaptation through negotiation and compromise.
Evaluation criteria for 'successfulness'	Degree of correlation between the goal of the undertaking and the local efforts/ arrangements.	Degree of correlation between wanted change in a social situation and actual results of the venture.
Overarching goal	Try to understand what contributes to efficient public governance.	Try to understand what modifies/conditions practically adapted results of public ventures.
Proponents	Pressman & Wildavsky 1973,1984 Van Meter & Van Horn 1975 Mazmanian & Sabatier 1980,1986	Elmore 1980 Hjern 1979,1981-82 Barrett 1984

Table 3.2 Differences between main methodologies in implementation theory. (based on Kjelberg og Reitan 1995: 162).

For proponents of the decision oriented approach, it is important that implementation has a starting point and an end and their view is that it can't succeed

or fail unless there is a goal to measure it by (ibid.). Others have insisted that implementation is to be seen as an uninterrupted process with no beginning and no end. As a representative for the process oriented approach, Elmore (1980 in Kjellberg & Reitan 1995: 155) states that the implementation should be a learning process where the shaping of a policy continuously changes and adapts to the problems it is supposed to solve. This means that it is not important if the original goal is carried through or not, it is the experiences in implementing a goal which are important, and the most imperative is the carrying on of these experiences to new ventures (Kjellberg & Reitan 1995:155).

Another important issue is *resources*:

Without resources in finance and personnel, implementation will have little chance in succeeding no matter how good ambitions people have for the venture (Kjellberg and Reitan 1995: 144).

So if people lack good ambitions for the venture, does it make a significant difference if they have sufficient resources for the implementation of it? When one tries to analyse the implementation of a venture, it can be difficult to know where to start. Looking at the early phases before the implementation process can give some clues to why it has been successful or not. Was there a clearly articulated plan, which only needs to be fulfilled or, which is an unambiguous assumption for everything that is going to happen later? Or does the phase before the implementation in reality consist of unclear signals, insecure intentions, and awaiting actors (ibid: 136)? Strategies that are supposed to cover a whole agency's activity are often an example of the last. These strategies are worded in an ambiguous way to avoid political disagreements. When there are possibilities to interpret a strategy in different ways, it is easier to get the strategy accepted. The strategy on environmental development co-operation provides a good example of how difficult it can be to agree and get a strategy on paper, it was discussed for 10 years (Andersen 2001: [personal comment]).

3.1.3 *Institutional theory.*

The concentration on formal aspects within 'old' institutionalism has been criticised by 'modern' scholars for several reasons. First, the strong focus on the

formal aspects of political systems has concealed important informal features from researchers (Peters 1999: 8). Second, with these formalistic assumptions political science could not function well in less developed countries, or countries that lacked the structures common in Western countries (Almond & Coleman 1960 in *ibid.*) Therefore, Peters continues:

“..to embrace a larger world, political science would have to learn to cope with other forms of analysis that were sufficiently general to apply to almost any political system” (Peters 1999: 8).

The ‘New Institutionalism’ should then be more capable of analysing informal structures and thereby also better suited for analysing institutional conditions in developing countries. The character of the different institutions which influence SLAMU can hopefully give explanations to why SLAMU is considered a success. In this case the main influencing institutions are the SLAMU organisation itself, ZAWA, GRZ and NORAD. The focus here will be mainly on the first and the last, since those two are the most important in this study and because there were problems in getting data from the other two institutions (See 3.2.3: 44) There are many different directions within institutional theory, but according to Scott, most can agree to this definition of institutions:

“Institutions consist of cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by various carriers – cultures, structures and routines – and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction (Scott 1995: 33).

Or in the words of March & Olsen:

“..an institution can be seen as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations (March & Olsen 1998: 948).

According to Peters (Peters 1999: 17), there are at least six different versions within ‘New Institutionalism’, and instead of going through all of them in detail, an eclectic approach with elements from the different directions will be used in analysing the role of the institutions on SLAMU. I will mainly focus on the different versions’ contributions to explaining the role of individuals, and the change of organisations. The core of institutionalism which binds the different version together can be summarised in four points:

The core of Institutionalism:

1. The most important element of an institution is that it is a structural feature of the society and /or polity,
 - formal (legislature, agency in public bureaucracy, legal framework)
 - or
 - informal (network of interacting organisations, set of shared norms).
2. Existence of some stability over time
3. Must affect individual behaviour. An institution should in some way constrain the behaviour of its members
4. Must be some shared value and meaning among the members.

(Based on Peters 1999).

Both NORAD and SLAMU are formal institutions, which have existed with some stability over time. Further, the behaviour of the members of an institution is constrained by a certain 'logic of appropriateness' and codes of conduct, which means that institutionalised rules, duties and rights, define acts as appropriate or inappropriate (Peters 1999: 18, March & Olsen 1998: 948). At the same time as institutions constrain individual behaviour, they also provide them with resources and therefore capabilities. Institutions are concentrations of resources, which make collective behaviour possible and efficient (Olsen 1992: 253). The different carriers mentioned in Scott's definition of institutions will be given unequal weight by different directions within the theoretic field, which is connected to the views on the role of individuals. The different views on change are also connected to the unequal weight given to culture, structure and routine. The differences and similarities between the approaches within institutionalism can be summarised as follows (based on Peters 1999):

SIMILARITIES:

- All stress the same fundamental analytic points.
- Most fundamental point - scholars can achieve greater analytical leverage by beginning with institutions rather than with individuals.

- All point to the role structure plays in determining behaviour, as well as determining the outcomes of political processes.
- All argue that institutions create greater regularities in human behaviour than would otherwise be found.
- Institutions are seen as the result of purposive human action, the fundamental paradox of institutions is being formed by human agents yet constraining those same actors. (In all versions of new institutionalism).

DIFFERENCES:

- The instrument through which constraint on the individual is exercised. In some it is through values and norms, in others through rules (intra- or inter-institutional).
- Degree of institutions' fixity/or capacity for change (planned or unplanned).
- Extent to which institutions are conceptualised as concrete objects, as opposed to more intangible collections of norms and values that have their influence primarily through the perceptions of the members of the institutions.

3.2 Research methods – introduction

Since political science students usually don't go on fieldwork, maybe especially not to developing countries, I need to use some literature on research methods from other disciplines. I find it necessary to have some reflections of a more human geographical or anthropological character as part of this thesis. Instead of repeating a lot of general contemplations from researchers and textbooks, I will try to relate the research methods directly to my research field.

3.2.1 *Choice of research methods*

When choosing research methods one has to think of what will be the best ways to reach the aim of the research, and within this consider the time, personnel and financial means which are available.

My starting point was Norwegian development co-operation and how it contributes to sustainable development in developing countries. I decided that I wanted to start

with one aspect of NORAD's work, namely the integration of environmental considerations in development co-operation, since that is an important aspect of Sustainable Development, and because I got the impression that it was problematic for NORAD. Since I also wanted to see what implications a development co-operation project could have for poor people in a rural area, I thought that a case study of a concrete development project would be a suitable choice. Yin (1994:2-3), argues that as a research endeavour, the case study contributes uniquely to our knowledge of individual, organisational, social and political phenomena, and the need for such a research method arises from the desire to *understand* these complex phenomena – to retain holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events – which was exactly what I wished to do. After having spoken to some NORAD employees, I chose a project in Zambia which was considered successful by NORAD. Since the focus on development aid is often negative, I wanted to contribute with research on a successful development project with three things in mind;

- 1) The hope that it can give possibilities of succeeding elsewhere, in that similar efforts can be made⁴².
- 2) That it can contribute to a more positive view on development aid, as a counterweight to the negative focus often presented in most public media.
- 3) To gain scientific knowledge about an important area of environment and development, and hopefully to be able to share it with other interested parties.

3.2.2 *Qualitative, quantitative or both?*

According to many scholars it is ideal to combine qualitative and quantitative research methods (e.g. Andersen 1990, Hesselberg 1998). If it is not possible to get reliable quantitative data that are utilisable, however, it is obvious that one has to use other and more qualitative methods (Andersen 1990: 16) With my relatively short stay, I didn't have time to conduct my own quantitative research, and there is not

⁴² In that at least other areas of Zambia can try some of the successful efforts from SLAMU, or maybe other African countries with similar natural resources.

much available from others either. I was told that some British MSc students had some questionnaires which were filled out by local people, but the doctor of wildlife economy who worked on the project earlier said that it was a waste of time (Child: 2002 [personal comment]). The reasons for this were that the people don't have the possibilities to understand the questionnaires properly because of lack of education, and they are also not used to that kind of thing. One could easily see from the questionnaires that they had misunderstood a lot of the questions (ibid.). To be able to get people's opinions, one has to talk to them, Child said, and I followed his advice as far as I could⁴³.

Another aspect that favours the approach I selected is that the context of data collection can be as important in explaining the data as the data themselves (Devereux & Hoddinott 1992: 4). They argue that;

“Unless and until this contextual dimension of data collection is fully recognised – and accepted as integral to the process – fieldwork results risk being reported in a way which is misleadingly ‘precise’ and ‘objective’(ibid.).

By this they mean that it has to be considered how one is perceived by the respondents, and within this to consider how one's gender, age and nationality may affect them. They give examples of how respondents gave systematically different answers to the same question on their age, depending on who was asked and who asked (ibid.) Both the experiences of Child and my own experiences show that it is important to consider the context and be aware of that the answers given can depend much on people's understanding and perception of the interviewer, the questions and what they think is the ‘right’ answer.

⁴³ Some of the people working at the project didn't have time to sit down with me while I was there, mainly because of the annual review meeting preparations. I left some questions for them to answer and send to me by post. Some answered others didn't, but the ones who answered had clearly misunderstood some of my questions. This observation also speaks in favour of the approach I selected, since even these people who were educated had problems with the written questions.

3.2.3 *Fieldwork with Qualitative Interviews.*

Fieldwork was a must. I went to Zambia to get to know the project properly, to get my own impressions by observing, and especially to find out which views *local* Zambians have. There was a possibility of reaching central authorities and possibly the management at SLAMU through post and partly through the Norwegian Embassy in Lusaka, but there are very clear weaknesses in such a research method, which has been touched upon above and will be elaborated on in the following. Also, getting to know the people who work in junior positions as well as senior, and seeing the community projects which had been started and finished, gave me a good understanding of how things function, which I would not have grasped had I not gone there. By being there I got a feel for the project and how it affected local people's lives, and since reaching the poorest is NORAD's main goal, I found it important to see if these people were actually reached, especially since the project was characterised as successful.

Conducting interviews and getting documents from NORAD in Oslo was no problem, but as mentioned, my wish was to go all the way down to a concrete project to be able to say something about the results in a developing country, not just the Norwegian politics, strategies and views. I managed to get a scholarship from the Norwegian Research Council through the Faculty of Social Science and the Institute of Political Science, which gave me the possibility to go to Zambia for 6 weeks. It would have been an advantage to stay longer, but the time and financial constraints made that impossible, and knowing that I had a limited period there, made me work hard to get as much out of it as possible. I carried out quite many interviews⁴⁴ of people that I and others found relevant for this study. Most have been done directly, but some follow-up questions have been sent by e-mail, fax or post. If one wants to know people's opinions on certain issues, depth is needed, and qualitative interviewing is a suitable research method (Hesselberg: 1998, Andersen: 1990).

The degree of structure can vary and one has to adopt different types of interviews as the process moves on. Patton (1990:288-89) has made a list of variations in

⁴⁴ See interviews list in appendix 2.

interview instrumentation, which was useful as an overview when I started to work on the structure of the interviews (in Mikkelsen 1995: 102-103). I started with some semi-structured interviews⁴⁵, to get to know NORAD better and thereafter the project in Zambia. These interviews were of type 1 and 2 in Patton's figure, that is 'informal conversational interview'⁴⁶ and 'interview guide approach'⁴⁷. These were matched to the individuals who were interviewed, used to form hypotheses and increase the relevance of later questions. Through some semi-standardised⁴⁸ and standardised open-ended interviews⁴⁹ later on, where the interviewees answered the same questions, the comparability of responses were increased (Mikkelsen 1995: 103).

By combining the different types of interviews, the weaknesses of them are lessened, as they supplement each other (ibid.). I have tried to formulate the questions as objectively as possible, following advice on good and bad questions and reading a lot about interviewing from several researchers within different disciplines (Mikkelsen 1995, Hesselberg 1998, Andersen 1990, Kvale 1996, Rubin & Rubin 1995, Berg 1989). Since being totally objective is impossible, asking a lot of different people the same questions and supplementing with some different questions, in addition to using different forms of interviewing at different stages, will help me in getting a wide variety of views. It will also be a method for checking the reliability in the responses.

As mentioned above, doing interviews face to face has some clear advantages, especially in the beginning when one doesn't know the study field well and maybe doesn't have a clear idea of what is most important to reach the aim of the research. In sitting face to face doing a semi-structural interview, one can let the interviewee

⁴⁵ semi-structural interview= only some of the questions and topics are pre-determined. Many questions will be formulated during the interview and irrelevant questions can be dropped. Questions are asked according to a flexible checklist or guide and not from a formal questionnaire (Mikkelsen 1995: 102).

⁴⁶ Informal conversational interview= questions emerge from the immediate context and are asked in the natural course of things; there is no predetermination of question topics or wording. This method was only used in Zambia, to find out what kind of positions people had, about their attitudes and so on.

⁴⁷ Topics and issues to be covered are specified in advance, in outline form; interviewer decides sequence and wording of questions in the course of the interview.

⁴⁸ Semi-standardised interviews= A number of predetermined questions and/or special topics, asked in a systematic and consistent order, but permitting the respondent to digress and go far beyond the answers to the question (Berg 1989: chapter 2).

⁴⁹ Exact wording of questions and sequence of them are predetermined. All interviewees are asked the same basic questions in the same order. Questions are worded in a completely open-ended format.

elaborate on things they find important and thereby be able to find out things one would not have, if the interviewee had answered to some strict questionnaire by post or e-mail. When they touch upon something that seems important, impulsive follow-up questions might bring important information. My experience is that questions are more easily misunderstood when in writing without the interviewer present, probably even more so in cases where English is used and the language is not the mother tongue of the interviewer or the interviewees. I tried to get the interviews which were impossible to conduct for various reasons when on fieldwork, done through post and fax. Unfortunately, some never answered. Because of this the main focus will have to be changed a little. Since I don't have the views of the local council and the ministry, it will be more fruitful to focus on the development possibilities in SLAMU and how it has affected peoples' lives, in addition to NORAD employees points of view.

I could see that some of the questions that were answered through post had been misunderstood; something that did not happen to the same degree when done directly, and then the possibility of clarifying directly was there. I let the interviewee finish before I tried to formulate a 'new' question to get an answer to what I wanted to know if they had misunderstood, so that no one would feel uncomfortable for not understanding.

When done by post, it is much more difficult to send new questions if one can see that they have misunderstood. This is particularly because the postal system is slow, unpredictable and relatively unreliable in the recipient country. Sending letters to make questions clear and getting new answers would take months. Luckily though, I got very good contact with some both current and former SLAMU employees, that I still have contact with through e-mail and fax. I have been able to send extra questions to and through them, which has been very helpful throughout the whole process. If I had not gotten to know these people so well during my fieldwork, this would have been impossible.

Another disadvantage by not going on fieldwork is that it can be difficult to know if the interviewees have understood the questions in the same way as you do yourself. When you don't see people it is more difficult to know how they have interpreted the questions. Some of the interviews I had planned were not conducted. One important

person, the former manager of LIRD/SLAMU for ten years, Mr. F. Munyenyembe unfortunately passed away before I got to interview him. I also struggled with transportation problems when in the Mfuwe area, since the SLAMU vehicles were much occupied, there is no public transportation and the distances were too wide to walk. Therefore, my plan was to talk to the Mambwe District Council representative, the District Administrator (DA) and a chief at the Annual Review Meeting for the local case, SLAMU, when back in Lusaka. Because of some misunderstandings⁵⁰, I was only able to have a brief talk with the District Administrator, and the other two were not willing to speak to me.

Some representatives for the central authorities were hard to reach, some promised to send me answers through fax and post, but I never received anything although I tried to call several times. These were the only ones who were not very co-operative during the fieldwork, and they were also the ones I didn't get to know – which shows that it is easier to get positive responses and understanding when meeting and getting to know people. All others on all levels were friendly, interested and helpful. The incident with the chief and the District Council representative was probably an example of differences in understanding, and maybe they felt that I wasn't showing them enough respect, which is related to the next sub-section on research in a different culture.

3.2.4 Research in a different culture - considerations on how to behave.

I think it is important to reflect on the subject of doing research in a country which is very different from my own. Being aware of cultural differences, consider how it will be appropriate to dress and behave among other things. Hesselberg (1998) has written a guide to questionnaires and interviewing in developing countries for postgraduate students of Human Geography. This is relevant for me because most

⁵⁰ The district council representative had heard that I had been in the Mfuwe area some weeks before the meeting and was obviously insulted that I had not taken the time to come and see him in his office. I tried to explain that it had proven too difficult with the transportation, and because of the distance between SLAMU HQ and the Mambwe District Council offices, I had not felt that it would be right to occupy a SLAMU vehicle for several hours to go there– especially since I knew I would see him in Lusaka. He had a different opinion.

Human Geography students go on fieldwork for some months like I did, and generally not as long as students of Anthropology. I found his advice clear and it lead me into a process of increasing awareness. Several researchers with fieldwork experience recommends living in the area, not just come to do interviews and then leave (Hesselberg: 1998, Devereux & Hoddinott: 1992, Mikkelsen: 1995). Involvement – to be able not just to observe but to participate in community life – adds a dimension to understanding which living apart can never provide (Devereux & Hoddinott 1992: 12).

The disadvantages mentioned are that if one lives with a family, the relationship with them usually means that one has to exclude them from any random sample, and the association with them inevitably influences how the people in their network perceive and respond to the fieldworker, for better or worse (ibid.) Some people may refuse to be interviewed because they have a strained relationship to the family the fieldworker lives with. I didn't experience any problems in this respect, probably because I wasn't really associated with any family. I lived in the house of a former employee, because no one new had been employed and thereby the house was empty. This way I lived very close to the SLAMU offices and many of the people in the area, without being directly associated to any family. I also saved a lot of time by living there, because it was only 5 minutes to walk to the offices, and I found out very early that it was a meeting place for people in the area. That way, by sitting at the community programme/CBNRM office with my work, I was able to observe what was going on, help with practical things when they had workshops, listen in and participate, and last but not least, talk to and interview a lot of people when they had the time. The employees at the community programme also shared their PC with me and explained a lot about their work through informal conversations. The contacts with them were invaluable, in that they also included me in workshops, both at the office and in villages, and later took me out to do interviews.

Hesselberg (Hesselberg 1998) also says that it is important to behave correctly, if one does something wrong it will spread quickly and can make future interviewees

The chief also meant that I should have seen him in the Valley, and said that he “didn't like to be taken by surprise” (communicated to extension officer Muzengesa at meeting 04.07.02).

more hostile. I spoke to a fellow student who had been in Zambia on fieldwork some months earlier, and also to some Zambians living in Norway before I went, to get some tips on how to behave. When in Zambia I spent a few days in the capital talking to the second secretary at the Norwegian Embassy, who also put me in contact with Dr. Child, who became one of my key informants. Both of them also gave me information about the Zambian culture and the project area in particular. No matter how well prepared one is, there will always be some dilemmas which will come up when living among the people one is interviewing, one example Hesselberg (ibid.) gives is beer drinking. I avoided this problem partly because they were too shy to ask me to join them in the beginning, and some also said that I seemed so busy with my work that they didn't want to disturb. There was a party on my last evening in the bush, which the young employees invited me to, and I could join without worrying about what people might think about it, since the interviews were over. It was a nice occasion to have informal conversations with a lot of people which gave me a last look into their life situation. It was also giving to get affirmative feed-back. Hesselberg (1998:39) also argues that although one should generally not give presents, it is okay to give something to the persons one works the most with, and to give away material things when leaving, that were bought for the stay. I knew that they would need the mosquito net, mosquito repellent, torch, some clothes and shoes much more than me, so it felt good to give it to them, especially the net and repellent since malaria is such a big threat and poor people don't have the possibility to prioritise such things.

Another thing Hesselberg mentions that several students have experienced, is that an informant can accuse students of "imperialism"– that they are "stealing knowledge" without giving anything back (Hesselberg 1998). I also experienced this to a certain degree, although it was not unfriendly. I was not directly accused of stealing knowledge, but some village people asked me if my work would make any difference in their lives, if they would gain anything from it in any way. The only thing I could say was that it was not up to me, but some NORAD employees and SLAMU people might read it, and that they *might* take some of my observations and possible advice into consideration. Even if they would not, at least I would know

more about their situation and be very grateful if they would help me to understand better. I said that they would be helping me in understanding and getting educated, which would never be wasted – they agreed to that.

3.2.5 Anonymity versus reliability

It is very difficult to know what is best, but one has to consider how sensitive the information is and if people wish to be anonymous that has to be respected. I agree with Hesselberg (1998:42) that it is important to let ethical considerations come before reliability. This goes for both letting informants be anonymous and letting the ones who don't want to be interviewed in peace (1998:41-42). In this case it is not necessary to give the place and project false names. There was a general acceptance of my research, and it is not the first time someone from the outside has come to do research in the area. I consider it to be enough to let some of the people I interviewed be anonymous. As long as I only say that they are, or have been employed in LIRDP/SLAMU, it will be very hard to find out who have said what. I am the only one who knows who I have interviewed; no one else has seen the list.

In Norway, some of my informants have asked not to be quoted on some of their statements, and some have asked to be anonymous. If the statements they have asked not to be quoted on are important for my findings they will still be used, but without saying who said it. Hesselberg (1998:43) also recommends that only parts of the thesis is translated and sent back to the studied area. Since all the people who have an interest in reading this thesis can read English, I don't need to have it translated, but I will certainly reflect on which parts I will send, to make sure that no one gets into any trouble and that no one are offended or hurt by what I write in any way. Since I understood that one of my informants in Zambia had been fired because of things he had said earlier – although something else was given as the reason– it is vital to make sure that I don't contribute to anything similar. The same goes for the Norwegian informants – the ones who trust me by letting me know things they would not have said publicly, will be given anonymity on certain statements.

3.3 Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have gone through the theoretical approaches that will be used in the analysis, and hopefully, the necessary methodological reflections have been made. As mentioned, the analysis will be on several levels, in 2 different countries, involving a lot of different people, and importantly, on concepts that are interdisciplinary in nature, which makes the ‘support’ of several approaches from different disciplines needed. Fortunately this is not new to me, since I have been studying many different disciplines, although the main contributions used are taken from political science, the other contributions will clearly be helpful in this study⁵¹.

The model in sub-section 1.2 above shows more specifically which relations will be examined in chapter 4. As partly mentioned in 1.2 and 2.5.4, the data collection both in Zambia and in Norway will be used to answer the following questions, starting with the general questions about NORAD and the international conventions, and going down to project level to analyse SLAMU and its community programme. All these questions will help determine Norwegian development co-operation’s contribution towards Sustainable Development:

- How can the problems of integrating environmental considerations in all development work be better understood?
- To what extent and in which ways have Sustainable Development, CBD and CITES influenced NORAD’s strategies?
- Which institutional features in NORAD play a positive role in realising the project goals?
- And which function as barriers?
- Is the decentralisation to SLAMU/the Community-programme having any effect on local government?
- How is the placement of the project under ZAWA instead of NPWS affecting the decentralisation/the autonomy of SLAMU/the Community-programme?
- How has the community-programme affected local people?

Or more specifically for the last question,

⁵¹ I am talking about contributions from Human Geography, Anthropology and Wildlife Economics, the first two mainly on research methods and the last as a support in the analysis.

- Which means are being used to empower⁵² people through the community programme?

⁵² See footnote 14 and section 2.1

4. Analysis

4.1 Introduction

In accordance with what I have written in the previous chapters, I will begin the analysis ‘at home’, with NORAD’s integration of environmental factors in the development work and how this is connected to Sustainable Development. Lafferty’s & Meadowcroft’s understanding of Sustainable Development will be used as an analytical tool. As mentioned in section 2.2, it involves seeing economic development, social development and environmental protection as interdependent and mutually reinforcing components⁵³. I will also look at the role of the two chosen international conventions for NORAD - CBD and CITES. Some reflections on the conventions influence on SLAMU directly will be made.

My second main chore is to analyse the institutional relationship between NORAD and SLAMU with the help of institutional theory, to be able to see what hinders and what promotes the daily work and further development of the project. The institutional features which influence the relationship between these two organisations, and which will be analysed further in this chapter are: institutional culture, competence on different issues and organisational form. Part of this will be to see if what happens in NORAD – with the integration of environmental factors and the role of the conventions – has any, or what kind of influence it has on SLAMU.

Thirdly, SLAMU’s Community Programme will be analysed to see how well it is able to fulfil some of NORAD’s and SLAMU’s primary goals – poverty reduction and empowerment. I will try to see how much the decentralisation of management responsibility for wildlife means in this work, how it is implemented and how the project can be defined with the help of implementation theory and decentralisation theory.

⁵³ For further explanation of Sustainable Development, see 2.2, especially pages 15-16.

4.2 The Integration of Environmental Factors in NORAD

The Norwegian government decided to integrate Sustainable Development (SD) in all sectors of Norway's foreign policy already in 1988 (Langhelle:2000). White Paper 46 (1988-89) outlined the Norwegian follow-up to the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), including the relations with developing countries. Two parts of SD are already integrated in the development work – social and economic development – so environmental issues was the weakest aspect, see model under 4.4.3. If SD is the means and/or the goal, equal weight has to be given to the three aspects within the concept; economic development, social development and environmental protection.

Efforts have been made to strengthen the environmental aspect within NORAD by, among other things, increasing the competence on environment. From 1996-1999 NORAD made a massive effort through an environment project (EP), with relatively limited results. When this project was ended, the project approach was left in favour of having visiting experts on environmental issues integrated in the technical department and region offices⁵⁴ instead (Strand 2003 [interview]). Strand (ibid.) maintained that the project “lived outside the organisation” and that integration has to happen on that level as well as on other levels. It seemed that this can be part of the explanation of why the results of the EP were limited, that is, the lack of integration is a reason for lack of learning in the organisation. This would also be corresponding to another explanation; both to the delay in the creation of the Environment project and its narrow results, that big organisations like NORAD need time to adopt a ‘new’ policy and plan how to integrate it with the already existing policies (Olsen 1992).

The ambitious main goal of the EP group was “to reach sustainable development which takes natural resources, biological diversity, cultural heritage protection and pollution problems into consideration (Jordfald in N&M bulletin 05/97). One can maintain that the integration with the other aspects within SD, and within the already existing focal areas should have been mentioned in the main goal. The environment project was supposed to increase the competence on environment both in NORAD

⁵⁴ See organisational chart of NORAD in appendix 1.

and in the recipient countries. However, it would have been beneficial to focus also here, on increased competence on the *interdependency* in addition to environment in itself. One of the means they used was to go through the routines in NORAD to improve them to secure that environmental factors are considered (ibid.). In addition, other Norwegian institutions with competence on environmental management were included in the development co-operation as support. The co-operation with these institutions has later been formalised as “Norwegian environmental assistance”⁵⁵. The head of the environment project said in an interview in 1997, that the aim was to make sure that the consideration of environmental factors would be fully integrated in the core of all departments in NORAD by the end of the environment project (Jordfald in N&M bulletin 05/97). To be able to implement/integrate a new criterion, some aspects play an important role. Besides resources – which include financial means, personnel and sufficient time – strategies which point out responsibility and way of implementing, and good ambitions/agreement on the issue, can be decisive.

Kjellberg & Reitan argue that;

Without resources in finance and personnel, implementation will have little chance in succeeding no matter how good ambitions people have for the venture (1995: 144).

In addition to these resources pointed out by Kjellberg & Reitan (1995), as mentioned above, the *time* spent on implementation can be vital. The environment project with its vast assignments lasted only three years, which makes it natural to question if that was sufficient time, especially considering that they spent a year on establishing the project, had one year of normal operation, and at the beginning of the last year the reduction of staff started (Hansson Jan. 2003 [e-mail]). The leader for the Environment Program found that the financial resources to environmental projects increased a lot during the existence of the EP and that the general consciousness on environmental issues increased (Jordfald Febr. 2003 [e-mail]). However, he writes:

⁵⁵ The formalised co-operation has its own internet page (<http://environment.norad.no>).

“The beginning was difficult. We spent about a year on establishing the project, because most of the environmental advisors had quit and it took time to recruit both those who were to be hired in permanent positions and those who were going to work in temporary positions in the EP. In addition, we had substantial lag on ordinary environmentally related work which had to be done as well....I saw it as important to get acceptance in the organisation, that we rendered the expected service internally and not only ran development work. This occupied a good deal of our capacity (ibid. (*my translation*)).

Jordfald's comments show that the resources set aside were not properly defined for the project, but also made them feel responsible for ordinary environmental work in addition to the recruiting of both temporary and permanent employment. The responsibility for recruitment of people to the permanent positions should have been given to someone outside the EP. If there were almost none left of the environmental advisers, it seems logical that someone in the leadership should have taken that responsibility.

When it is considered that environmental considerations are not properly institutionalised in NORAD, the building of the new SLAMU headquarters in Mfuwe makes a good illustrating example of lack of institutionalisation both there and in the local SLAMU. Even in the local project where environmental consideration is such an important aspect, they managed to start building without doing an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) which is a demand not only in all Norwegian development work but also according to Zambian laws (Grøva: Nov. 2002 [e-mail]). None of the actors involved – NORAD, ZAWA, SLAMU's leadership, the Zambian building authority, tender board, architects and technical advisers – reacted to the lacking EIA. It was someone from the tourist industry who asked about the placement of all these buildings and a plan for it, which made people realise that they were actually supposed by law, to have had both an EIA and a Land Use Plan from the beginning (ibid.).

When it was discovered that there was a lot of unplanned and unfavourable building going on in other parts of the area as well, The Environmental Council of Zambia stopped all building activity in the whole area. Nothing will be finished or started until a Land Use Plan has been made, which is currently being developed with the help of WWF, and NORAD is supporting it through funding. The building of the

headquarters has not had any severe environmental consequences, but in this case were no precautions were taken, it was pure luck (ibid.). After the mistake became known, all parties have done their best to co-operate on the Land Use Plan, and the work seems to be going well (own observations including workshop, Grøva: Nov. 2002 [e-mail]).

Even if there are still some initiatives for further integration of environment in NORAD, the main effort was the environment project, and evaluations of the integration⁵⁶ have pointed out that it is still not satisfactory. So what can help explain the lack of full integration? To be able to make some contributions towards understanding the problems with integration, the strategies (4.3) and some of NORAD's institutional features (4.4) will be analysed below.

4.2.1 The Strategies - Report no.19 to the Storting (1995-96), NORAD invests in the future 2000-2005, & SEDC⁵⁷.

As mentioned in chapter 2, all the strategies touch upon environmental factors in the development work, but they neither focus on the *connection* between the aspects, nor the connection between SD and poverty reduction to a sufficient degree. The different aspects within SD are all touched upon *separately* in connection with poverty reduction, but are not seen together, which would show the interdependency. The further one goes in time from the WCED-report and the UNCED in Rio, the less Sustainable Development is mentioned in the strategies. The first and best when seen with 'Sustainable Development glasses', is Report no. 19 to the Storting from 1995-96. It maintains that

“The overriding goal of Norwegian south policy is to contribute towards improving economic, social and political conditions in the developing countries within the limits of sustainable development (Report no. 19 1995-96: 2 and 11)

It is further argued that the different main areas of the South-politics must be seen in connection to each other, so that they can strengthen each other (ibid: 11) and that the

⁵⁶ As earlier mentioned, the external evaluations after the environment project was ended were the ProSus-report from 2000 and the Office of the Auditor General of Norway from 2002.

government wants to strengthen the work on integrating environment in the development co-operation in general. When it comes to the position of women it is said that the achievement of greater gender equality is a matter of economic development, human rights, and social justice, and is one of the premises for Sustainable Development (ibid: 6, 34-35). Among other things, the connection between women and management of natural resources is highlighted and there are many more good examples of how the connection between the different areas within the development work is seen: trade development within the frames of Sustainable Development, education in relation to population development, health, nutrition, environmental consciousness and resource conservation. Unfortunately, there are few examples of this in the other strategies.

The next is the Strategy on Environmental Development Co-operation (SEDC) from 1997, which barely mentions Sustainable Development and superficially refers to the connections within the concept. It seems that most of SEDC is concentrated on special environmental development projects, although the principle of integration of environmental consideration in *all* regular development work is mentioned, with a reservation in saying “where it is relevant” (SEDC: 1). This last part has a symbolically negative effect. It makes it much easier to disregard environmental factors when working with a project or programme which is not directly environmentally targeted, especially for those who don’t have much competence on environment. It can also be used as an excuse for not having regarded the environment because it ‘didn’t seem relevant’ no matter if there are environmental consequences of a venture or not.

Later, in the appendix from NORAD it is maintained that the integration of environment in all development co-operation shall be upheld and strengthened, without mentioning ‘where it is relevant’ (SEDC: 18). But then two examples of areas where the integration of environment is easiest reached from a Norwegian view is given, the primary industries and sectors where Norway has special competence. This can clearly be seen as self-contradictory. In the same sub-chapter integration in all development work is emphasised and thereafter special focus is given to two very

⁵⁷ See section 2.3 for background information on the strategies.

limited areas within development work. When it comes to the question of *how* to integrate environmental factors, there are no concrete suggestions in the appendix which is supposed to show ‘guiding lines for operationalisation and visualisation of the strategy for the primary users’, NORAD employees.

The third strategy in time is the current overarching, main strategy “NORAD invests in the future, 2000-2005”. It says:

The overriding goal of development co-operation is to contribute towards lasting improvements in the economic, social and political conditions of the population of developing countries, with the particular emphasis on ensuring that aid benefits the poorest people (NORAD invests in the future: 9).

Sustainable Development is not mentioned, nor is environmental factors in connection with the overriding goal. This shows how the integration of environment has been ‘forgotten’ on the highest strategic level. However, environment and natural resource management is one of the points in the list of focal areas on the same page, after that it is barely mentioned until the last part of the strategy, “Areas in which NORAD invests”. Does this show someone from the outside that environment is well integrated and prioritised in the development work like some people maintain? Where is the Sustainable Development approach from the report to the Storting in 1995-96? When Lomøy (2002: [interview]) maintains that Sustainable Development is integrated and therefore political fronting is not needed anymore, does that mean that it needn’t even be mentioned? All the other prioritised aspects within the development work are mentioned often, like social development, human rights, the principle of recipient responsibility, democratic development, economic development and so on – does this mean that these aspects are not integrated? That is obviously not the case, but they are naturally still part of the main strategy, which shows that Sustainable Development has clearly lost political momentum (Langhelle 2000). This is one of the reasons why it is not mentioned, not that it has been integrated. The General Director of NORAD also mentioned that Sustainable Development and environment has not been outspokenly politically prioritised as long as she has been in NORAD (Since 1996) (Strand 2003 [interview]). She continued:

That does not mean that we are not working with these issues. We try all the time, to make systems which are so secure that we don't put aside things that are important when new things come up... We have four sustainability elements in everything that we do, but not everything comes out in writing, its just routine... Our challenge is to keep a good level on those things that are important on the whole all the time.

It is easy to see the changing trends in the different strategies. As mentioned above, Sustainable Development was strong in 1995-96 but in 1999⁵⁸ when the main strategy was formulated, different social development aspects had taken over again. Although the recipient responsibility was emphasised in the strategy from 95-96, it is much more dominating in the main strategy together with Human Rights.

When Opsal said that the strategies are not the problem but the practical implementation of the environmental aspects (2002: [interview]), this was at first seen as unproblematic. However, after having read the strategies again, I realised that a clarification and operationalisation of (the problems with) the strategies can also help ease the practical work. At the same time, I have understanding for the fact that it is seen as more important to use the resources on practical integration. Nevertheless, since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has the main responsibility for the development of strategies, most of the resources to improve the strategies would be engaged in MFA and not NORAD, so that NORAD could still work on the implementation. It has been pointed out that NORAD is not much involved in, or doesn't contribute much to strategies and other policy work (NORAD employee 2002 [interview], former NORAD employee 2002 [interview]). The current division of responsibility can be a reason for lack of 'ownership' of the strategies, that the strategies are not properly related to NORAD employees' daily work. My impression from all the documents in the archive is that NORAD is often given a short time-limit by the Ministry to contribute to policies and strategy work, which can make it an extra burden. However, Moen pointed out that this has been improved (2003: [interview]).

Some preliminary concluding remarks on the integration of environment can be made so far. It seems apparent that the focus on the connections between the aspects

⁵⁸ Espen sees the same tendency in her thesis "Pasvik, management of a transnational watercourse" (forthcoming 2003)

within Sustainable Development and the prioritised areas within the development co-operation, which overlap, needs to be more clearly and more profoundly dealt with in the strategies. This will make it easier for NORAD staff to work holistically, consider all areas and see the interdependency. It will probably also help them in integrating environmental factors and other ‘new’ aspects which will come in the future. In trying to simplify by dividing up a whole into different areas, it seems that things have become more complicated and less surveyable for NORAD employees.

4.2.2 Institutional features of NORAD

Both ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ – the origins and the paths by which an institution has arrived where it is – are important (Berman 1983: v in Olsen 1988: 252). In the case of NORAD it seems that the roots are strong, while the routes have been going in different directions according to trends in society, and parliament’s influence. However, as different trends wear off, or it is decided that a part-goal has been reached, the tendency seems to be a return to the original main focus – social development. This assumption is based on the fact that NORAD’s main strategy⁵⁹ puts a lot of emphasis on issues which can be placed under social development as an overarching aspect, and this has a strong symbolic effect. In addition there are several sub-strategies on social issues⁶⁰ and my own impressions from observations and interviews also indicate emphasis on social development, which will be further analysed below. If we first allow a little speculation⁶¹ on why the social development aspect is so strong, there are at least two possible factors. First, different types of people are drawn to different types of institutions (Olsen 1992: 253). It should be fair to assume that most NORAD employees are more idealistic and involved in solidarity than the average person. Their main reason for seeking a job at NORAD is probably

⁵⁹ “NORAD invests in the future - NORAD’s strategy for 2000- 2005”

⁶⁰ “HIV/AIDS and development - Norway’s views”, “NORAD’s Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Action Plan”, “Action plan for human rights”, NORAD’s “Handbook in Human Rights Assessment”, and “Strategy for female- and equal rights oriented development co-operation”.

⁶¹ Olsen calls one of the sections in his article “Analyzing Institutional dynamics”, “**Speculating** about institutional dynamics”. This is mentioned to show that known researchers speculate, as a justification of the speculation here. It is also to show recognition of a little speculation which can bring innovation together with empirical findings. Hopefully this kind of ‘brainstorming’ can bring new ideas and help to solve problems.

that they wish to contribute to a more just world, which is also deeply entrenched in the history of, and the foundation of NORAD⁶². In this connection it is natural to see a wide definition of social development (including economic development) as the most important issue since it can be easily seen as a means in poverty reduction.

Second, when ‘new’ aspects are added to the list of criteria for assessing projects or programmes without removing any, it makes the job more complicated. Some employees point to the fact that they have a lot of strategies and criteria to relate to, and one maintained that several employees stationed at different embassies had not even read the strategy for environmental development co-operation⁶³. When asking about environmental considerations, some constantly reminded me of all the other aspects they also had to consider. Even if it is not an excuse, it can be hard to focus on several complicated concerns at once, especially under time pressure, and one may well end up putting most focus on what one personally finds the most important, and partly neglect other factors.

Just like democracies live with conflict between institutionalised rule-sets (Olsen 1992: 253), so do institutions⁶⁴. When institutions in addition have some ‘rule-sets’ which are not properly institutionalised that they have to work on integrating because parliament or others on the outside demands it, it makes it even more complicated. Even though there is no outspoken direct conflict between economic- and social factors against environmental factors within NORAD, the lack of focus on the interdependency between them makes it harder to remember the consideration of environmental factors in relation to projects and programmes, since environment has a weaker position. It is not only environment that needs to be better integrated, but also the focus on the interdependency between it and social and economic development⁶⁵ in the organisation and work descriptions, just like in the strategies as

⁶² In Report no. 19 to the Storting (1995-96) it says: A wish to realise international solidarity is a cornerstone in the Norwegian involvement in the developing countries (p.11)

⁶³ When a high degree of trust is reached and controversial issues are touched upon, it is important to give the informant anonymity on those statements. I have been trying to minimise anonymous statements, but when considered important in trying to explain something, they have been included in the study. For further contemplations on anonymity versus reliability, see section 3.2.5.

⁶⁴ As mentioned, there is disagreement on how institutionalised environment is, but even if environmental factors is not an *institutionalised* rule-set, there is no doubt about the possibility of conflict.

⁶⁵ See for instance <http://www.forskningsradet.no/nyheter/notiser/melding.html/12991>

mentioned in section 4.3. Sustainable Development is a relatively complicated concept, and many in NORAD have more education and competence on economic and social issues than on environmental ones,⁶⁶ which can also make it more difficult to make sure that environmental factors are considered. Maybe SD is more of a problem for the employees than most are consciously aware of or willing to admit?

4.2.3 The organisation of NORAD – role of the leadership and internal dynamics

When asked about the role of Sustainable Development, several employees answer that it is what NORAD is working towards (e.g. Lomøy:2002, Grøva:2002 [interviews]). With this in mind, one would expect that it would be visible both in strategies and the way the offices are organised. In the organisation of the offices however, environment is not given as much place and resources as the other two aspects within SD. It is placed in the Technical Department in the Unit for Environment and Energy, the employees in the unit have no implementation responsibility for programmes or projects, and the executive officers in the regional offices are not obliged to consult them (Ås: 2002 [interview], Skjøsberg: 2000). This doesn't harmonise with the goal of integrating environmental factors in all development co-operation, like Skjøsberg (2000) has pointed out before. The head of the Unit for Environment and Energy, stated that he thought Skjøsberg's research report had really opened the eyes of many NORAD employees (Opsal: 2002 [interview]).

The idea behind the current organisation is that the expert advisers on environmental issues (and on human rights, health, education and son on) are situated in a separate department without implementation responsibility to be able to make impartial judgements on programmes or projects. If they are more closely involved in (implementation of) programmes or projects, it would be like evaluating themselves when considering the possible environmental impacts. After the environment project was ended in 1999, the number of employees in the environment field was reduced

⁶⁶ See also the explanation connected to the 'competency trap' under 4.3.2 p.56

from thirteen to three (Jordfald: Jan. 2003 [e-mail]). If the consideration of environmental factors had been as integrated in all departments as Jordfald hoped for, the reduction might not have been a problem, but many have stated that environmental factors are not well enough integrated (Skjønberg 2000, Andersen Jan. 2003 [e-mail], Larsen 2002 [interview], Ås 2002 [interview], and the Auditor General 2002). It seems that environmental factors have been tolerably integrated in strategies, but not well enough in the organisation and thereby not in the daily work.

Another important aspect, as partly mentioned above, is the role of the leadership. My assumption is that the leadership has to have a genuine interest in, and will to see implementation through, to get an aspect integrated in an institution. That means that it is at least partly up to the leadership to get environment fully integrated in all development-co-operation. The leader(ship) of an institution, especially a small and hierarchical one, can make evident changes in the behaviour of the institution (Peters 1999: 36). But, Peters (*ibid.*) continues:

Even then, however, the compliance may be only for aggregative, instrumental reasons rather than a reflection of any real changes in the values that undergird behaviour. If that is so, then in institutional terms there may not have been any meaningful change.

It is possible that this can be part of the explanation to the weaker role of environment compared to other aspects in NORAD, because the organisation is big with a flat organisational structure, it must be more difficult for the leadership to initiate changes. It seemed that the Director had interest in implementing environment and clearly she saw it as an important part of NORAD's work (Strand 2003 [interview]), but maybe this is not clear to the employees? And maybe having three visiting environmental experts from other institutions at all times is not sufficient? According to Kjellberg & Reitan, if the leadership doesn't secure sufficient attention on, and resources for the integration of a 'new' aspect, there will be little chance of success (Kjellberg & Reitan 1995). Environment is not a new aspect anymore, but it needs attention to become institutionalised as long as this has still not happened.

The employees stand very free – it becomes more difficult to control that everybody make the necessary considerations both environmentally and otherwise. It can also make it difficult to follow up strategic changes, and thereby critique comes

from parliament and others, when it has been decided that NORAD should change its focus and it is not happening to a sufficient degree. The flat structure and the freedom the employees have, also gives the institution less continuity and the institutional memory is weakened compared to other more formal institutions (like MoE) (NORAD employees [interviews]).

On the other hand, the flat organisational structure can be motivating in that the employees feel that they are given much responsibility. They also travel very much, and move around within the institution to a great extent (Moen: 2003 [interview]), which should give good possibilities for learning and seeing things from different sides. Besides the way NORAD is organised, we might find parts of an explanation in other areas like the institutional culture.

4.2.4 Institutional culture and values in NORAD

Within historical institutionalism, ‘path dependency’ is seen as a tendency in governments (Peters 1999: 64), but it is just as relevant for a big institution like NORAD. ‘Path dependency’ means that once the initial policies and institutional choices in a policy area are made the patterns created will persist, unless there is some force sufficient to overcome the inertia created at the inception of a programme (ibid.). If ‘path dependency’ is one reason why environment has not been integrated in NORAD, it must be because the various attempts to integrate it over time, have not been a strong enough force to change the initial policies.

Another ‘version’ of ‘path dependency’ is what Olsen & March calls the ‘competency trap’ (1992: 964). It is defined as a tendency for a system to become firmly locked into a particular rule-based structure by virtue of developing familiarity with the rules and capabilities for using them (ibid.). Even though NORAD is seen as a flexible organisation, especially by its own employees, the ‘path dependency’ or ‘competency trap’ can be a logical part of an explanation for at least two reasons.

First, even though this might be a weaker trend now than before, many have been working at NORAD most or even their whole career. These people don’t really know any other organisational system, and the exploitation and refinement of known

practices and rules tend to drive out the exploration of possible new ones (Olsen & March 1992: 965) The longer one works in an organisation and thereby increases one's competence, the larger becomes the disadvantage of new rules and practices (ibid.)

Second, even though NORAD employees shift positions very often within the organisation, which should indicate high flexibility, the rules and practices are mainly the same. They might have a feeling of change and being flexible because of the moving around, which can make them feel less stuck in patterns than they really are. Both at the headquarters in Oslo and at the embassy, people seemed to have a very clear picture of what the main goal of NORAD is and that everything has to be clearly related to that. If a project changes and it becomes hard to see the direct connection to economic or social development which leads to poverty reduction, a problem arises. When the main focus of the SLAMU project in Zambia was partly changed to wildlife management, the community programme within it became more important to NORAD, because it entails empowerment of local villagers, and thereby the connection to social development was secured.

One of the NORAD employees said that there must be resistance in the system since integration of environment has been a goal for such a long time without getting properly integrated (NORAD employee 2002 [interview]). If the integration of environment is seen as a reorganisation from an institutional theoretic point of view, it implies that strong organisational capabilities are needed to stabilise attention, mobilise resources and, last but not least, cope with resistance (Olsen 1992: 256) If both the institutional culture is traditional and strong, and the resources spent on the integration of new aspects is not sufficient, the integration of environment in the development co-operation will be very hard. Several former employees – both people who were at NORAD as permanent employees for a substantial period of time, and those who were there temporarily as environmental experts from other institutions – have indicated that they didn't feel that they 'fitted' within the organisational culture (former NORAD employees 2002/2003 [interviews]). It must be mentioned that some of them think that things have improved after Tove Strand took over as General Director (ibid.).

It also makes it hard to integrate environment since it is supposed to be in *all* development work. If it had been something which was new to only one programme, which involves a smaller group of people, it would be easier to integrate. In addition, if it was an aspect which was easier to integrate as part of the already institutionalised aspects, or an aspect which was already there but was given new attention, like education has been lifted lately, it would also be easier. In other words, the responses of an institution to external events and proposed reforms, will be influenced by the matching of the events/reforms and the identity, history and internal dynamic of that institution (Olsen 1992: 257). Limitations in time and attention, reluctance against creating or re-opening conflicts, and ambiguity when it comes to the effects of institutional changes, contributes to a protection of action-programmes close to the institutional core against large and quick changes (Olsen 1988: 24).

When related to NORAD, the focus on Sustainable Development including environment in society in general, and the demands of integration in the development work from parliament, is dependent on how well it is seen to match with the already existing focus, practices, competence and so on. An alternative is to see the integration of environment as a still ongoing process, and some have this very process-oriented view (see Kjellberg & Reitan 1995: chapter 5). Because of institutional inertia, especially in big organisations like NORAD, it takes a long time before 'new' approaches get integrated. The fact that the environment project in NORAD was initiated almost ten years after the WCED-report was published and after the general societal interest in Sustainable Development had fallen, shows that it takes time to make changes in large institutions. As mentioned in chapter 2, the Strategy on Environmental Development Co-operation (SEDC) was also finalised late, it took ten years from it was initiated until it was printed (Andersen 2001 [interview]).

Environmental factors have been incrementally and partly integrated and as time moves on and the staffs are changed, environment might get a more natural role and be fully integrated. When interviewing the employees in the Unit for Environment and Energy, one *hypothesis* that was mentioned was that younger people are more interested in environmental questions than older people. The follow up of this was

that there might be a bigger chance of integrating environment in NORAD's work when the amount of new and young employees becomes higher. My general impression is that this is normally the case, but even if environmental issues –and the importance of these – has been more focused on during the last two decades, and also partly in kindergartens and schools, it does not mean that the majority of young people will have a stronger interest than older people. This can also be used as an excuse for the lack of integration, indicating that 'old' people can't change and therefore 'new and young' people are required to reach the goal of integration.

There are always exceptions to any rule, which was confirmed by the group interview with the Zambia-Malawi team. The oldest person in the group was the one who seemed most inclined to consult the technical department, and who viewed it as a security net rather than a strait jacket. She also believed that if environmental considerations were not taken by the recipient country, NORAD had to make sure that this was done. The youngest on the other hand meant that if the recipient country wished to disregard environmental consequences because they viewed economic development as more important, then they should be allowed to do so. This statement is directly in opposition to the criticism that came from the Office of the Auditor General's report recently. It states that NORAD's degree of involvement and follow up has to be considered in relation to the recipient country's capacity and context, but the Norwegian responsibility to control that environmental considerations are made cannot be disregarded (Document no. 3: 4 2002-2003: 38).

This example shows that personal understanding, knowledge, interests and background can be part of the integration problems. It can also be seen as lack of training. Pressman & Wildavsky's statement that an implementation process must have a beginning and an end (see chapter 3.1.1), can be part of an explanation to the disagreement on the level of integration of environmental considerations in the development co-operation. Many people need to 'finish' things, which mean that they need a beginning and an end to the implementation of for instance a project. The strategies are however in many instances not clear enough on aims and goals and doesn't specify measures that should be taken, which results in different interpretations and disagreements on whether something has been implemented and if

original goals have been reached or not. In addition, (political) measures can be ambiguous when it comes to means, and who is to have the responsibility (for implementation (Sørvang 1984 in Kjellberg & Reitan 1995: 136).

NORAD's main goal has always been poverty reduction, but not always considering possible environmental consequences. There have been cases where social consequences have not been well considered either, but in those cases it has been because someone made the wrong judgements on the social impacts of a project, not because it was not considered at all like the case has been with environment. Considering the social impacts is much more integrated in the way NORAD employees work than the consideration of environmental impacts. Lafferty & Meadowcroft (2000) illustrate well that there are physical environmental constraints as well as ethical constraints on developmental activity⁶⁷, which is especially relevant for development agencies like NORAD. This is because the failure of not considering these constraints will undermine their own activity. If a resource is depleted, it can be very difficult or even impossible to get it back to a normal level, which several examples can show.⁶⁸ This will be further discussed under 4.5 since it is related to the international environmental conventions.

4.2.5 Any solutions?

In my opinion, since the two aspects social - and economic development still stand much stronger in NORAD than environmental protection, and actually entail two of the six main areas⁶⁹, a reorganisation of strategic goals as a part of a possible solution might be a reorganisation of strategic goals. The leadership would have to play an important role and take responsibility for it. Since there is no single, easy and 'right' answer to how environment can be strengthened and integrated better, and different minds will have different views, what we can do is to make some more suggestions of

⁶⁷ See also page 14 in chapter 2.

⁶⁸ A known example is the Victoria Lake fisheries, video can be watched at <http://www.intermedia.uio.no/publikasjoner/streaming/big-fish/stream.html> or the internet pages <http://www.sum.uio.no>

possibilities. First, to put the SD-triangle as the main focus on strategic level, because disregarding any of the three aspects would mean undermining NORAD's own activity. That is not to say that all three aspects are, or have to be, part of all programmes or projects. But they have to be *regarded* in the planning-, execution- and completion phases to make sure that no unforeseen social, environmental or economic effects will appear.




Figure 4.1 Sustainable Development Triangle

Second, on a practical level of how to organise the offices, there are two options. One is to make the consulting of the experts in the Unit for Environment (and Energy) in the Technical Department obligatory. It would mean that the capacity has to be increased, for them to be able to handle all programmes or projects. Another option is to integrate the experts on environment in the regional offices instead of keeping them on the sideline in the Technical Department. This would probably be seen as problematic by some because of the idea behind the present organisation, see 4.4.1 p.60. On the other hand, it has been indicated that the present situation is not

⁶⁹ The areas referred to here are the ones listed in NORAD's main Strategy, taken from Proposition no. 1 (1998-99) to the

working very well with the Technical department as an “internal consulting company”, and that there is a high level of frustration among the employees in the Technical Department (Jordfald Jan. 2003: [e-mail]), Moen 2003: [interview]).

The opposite of the idea behind the present organisation would be that integration of the environmental experts in the region offices could give them a feeling of ‘ownership’. Being more closely included and having responsibility in assessment and follow up of projects, could just as well function as a motivation to make sure that no harmful environmental consequences come from ‘their’ projects. To be able to integrate environment better, to reach a twenty year old goal, to get closer to Sustainable Development, and in the future be able to avoid criticism like that of Skjønberg (2000) and the Office of the Auditor General of Norway (2002), this is a possibility that should be assessed. As for the option above, it would also necessitate increasing the capacity on environment, since there are now only three employees working directly with environment in the technical department. Since there are four regional offices⁷⁰, at least one more person would be needed to cover the region offices.

It might be that some NORAD employees in general are more focused on the direct developmental parts of their work and see the environmental factors as problems getting in the way of the development work. Those who have this focus will clearly get problems when demanded to consider environmental factors. Integrating the environmental experts in the regional departments could also contribute to dealing with this, and fulfilling the plan of more teamwork like the Director General has emphasised. So far there are more ‘nice words’ about teamwork than real action in some departments (anonymous 2003: [interview]).

Storting.

⁷⁰ The regional offices are: department for Southern Africa, department for Eastern Africa, department for Asia and department for Latin America, the middle East and Eastern Europe.

4.3 The roles of Conventions in NORAD's work and for SLAMU.

International environmental conventions in general play a small role in NORAD's work, they are handled by the Ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of the environment (MoE). One could expect a connection between development work and the international conventions on biodiversity, since there is a general acknowledgement of the threat that loss in biodiversity represents to basic human needs, especially in food and medicine, and particularly for rural poor people (SEDC 1997, Swanson 1997, Rosendal 1999, Paavola 2002). As mentioned earlier, the greatest variety of biodiversity *and* the greatest loss of it are in developing countries. This is another reason why one could expect a conscious connection between international conservation work and development co-operation on biodiversity issues. In addition, it is specifically mentioned in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) that the overriding priority of the developing countries is poverty reduction, see section 2.2.1. For these reasons, the roles of CBD and The Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES) will be analysed below.

One of the provisions of the Zambia Wildlife Act (ZWA) from 1998 is implementation of these two conventions. What kind of role do these conventions play in development work? Have they had any influence on NORAD's work generally and on SLAMU specifically?

4.3.1 *The convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)*

Of all the people I interviewed in the first round, no one said that CBD is important for their work or for the project in Zambia⁷¹. One who holds a doctorate in wildlife economics said that CBD was irrelevant for SLAMU (Child:2002 [interview]), and one of the senior wildlife police officers said that he had not heard anything about CBD having any influence on the project (Skabala 2002 [interview]). Most of the Zambians hadn't even heard of CBD, while the NORAD employees in the Unit for Environment and Energy in Oslo said that they use it for what it is worth when

⁷¹ Direct interviews and e-mails with Biseth, Child, Chimba, Gulnes, Lubilo, Nesvåg, Opsal, Sauvik, Ås, all 2002/2003.

evaluating applications (Opsal and Ås 2002 [interviews]). The Head of the Unit for Environment and Energy said that the connection between CBD and the concrete projects or programmes is too weak. He wanted to strengthen it in the work of the Unit by systematically making it more visible (Opsal 2002 [interview and e-mail]). In addition, he thinks that they might have to put more emphasis on specific projects which can contribute towards implementation of the conventions. This is a future goal (ibid.).

In general the employees in the Unit for Environment and Energy had a more conscious relationship to the convention than the others, which is not very surprising or unnatural. In the second round of interviews, which was after the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, I was told that some of the embassies have started to use the international conventions more actively, which was seen as a very positive development (Ås: 2002 [Interview B]). This was also mentioned and thereby confirmed by the Zambia-Malawi team at NORAD. Several developing countries have shown interest in CBD and especially the Cartagena protocol⁷². This interest has led to co-operation between some developing partner countries and NORAD on preparation to fulfil the requirements, which makes the co-operation a fulfilment of CBD for Norway (Ås and Opsal [interview B]).

In the Norwegian national report on implementation of the CBD (1997), there's a chapter on Development Co-operation and other international work. On the bilateral development co-operation it says:

“Norway has for many years used development assistance to support measures that have a positive effect on nature management and biological diversity in recipient countries [...]” (1997: 62).

The problem, however, is that *all* programmes have not been evaluated by environment advisers or at least checked by the executive officer responsible for a

⁷² The Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted a supplementary agreement to the Convention known as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on 29 January 2000. The Protocol seeks to protect biological diversity from the potential risks posed by living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology. It establishes an advance informed agreement (AIA) procedure for ensuring that countries are provided with the information necessary to make informed decisions before agreeing to the import of such organisms into their territory. The Protocol contains reference to a precautionary approach and reaffirms the precaution language in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. The Protocol also establishes a Biosafety Clearing-House to facilitate the exchange of information on living modified

project. Since not all executive officers check for possible environmental impacts or have an environment adviser look at it before it is approved, there have also been programmes or projects which have had severe *negative* consequences⁷³. Sometimes negative impacts on the environment have been unforeseen and were actually considered in the preparatory phase of a project, but lack of control or follow up in the execution and completion phases gives possibilities for negative impacts as a project develops –which is exactly what the Office of the Auditor general is pointing out in their report (2002). When even projects that are categorised as environmentally targeted projects don't check for, or report on, environmental effects of for instance buildings, it must mean that the awareness is not high enough and not incorporated well enough into work descriptions and introduction courses for new employees.

4.3.2 *The convention on trade in endangered species of flora and fauna (CITES).*

CITES is not even mentioned on NORAD's home pages, nor in the Strategy on Environmental Development Co-operation or anywhere else in NORAD's guiding documents for that matter. The advisers in the Unit for Environment and Energy said that CITES is not an important convention for NORAD (Opsal and Ås:2002 [interview B]). One explanation might be that there are not many projects like SLAMU among the NORAD supported projects, which means that as long as NORAD is not supporting many projects where CITES can play a part, it is not considered important. For many other developing countries besides Zambia, CITES can be very important to; Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, Sri Lanka and others⁷⁴. If the emerging interest in biodiversity shown by some developing countries in relation with the WSSD – among them Zambia – is genuine and continues, it might be necessary for NORAD to put more resources in, and get more competence on biodiversity and the conventions on the theme.

organisms and to assist countries in the implementation of the Protocol
(<http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/background.asp>)

⁷³ Examples from Africa are schrimp farming in Uganda , Victoria Lake fishing project, and more.

⁷⁴ Some of these countries are currently not co-operating with NORAD, but it is an issue which is always considered as the times and political leadership changes. Kenya will be considered after the democratic election in December 2002, since Daniel Arap Moi gave up power.

Two of the employees in NORAD's Zambia-Malawi team said that they had been working with CITES before when they were stationed at embassies in South-Africa and Zimbabwe. The reasons given were that CITES was (is) important to these countries, and therefore the embassies focused on CITES to help the recipient countries in their work with it (Biseth and Gulnes 2002 [group interview]). However, now when they are back in Norway, CITES is not part of their work. The newest employee in the team had touched upon CITES when working with research on trade in traditional medicines in South Africa before he started working at NORAD. The conclusion was that the most important thing for the team was to know a little about everything, to know who to consult, where to get more information or knowledge when that is needed.

CITES was known to a higher degree than CBD among the Zambians. Although known, this was due to only one aspect – the ban on elephant hunting. In Zambia generally, and the Luangwa Valley specifically, the CITES global ban on elephant hunting has caused severe problems. It has reduced the revenue with something between 25-50 per cent (Child: 2002 [interview]). Dr. Child argued that one could sustainably have hunted ten elephants a year for \$ 10.000 each, which would have given the local people a lot more to live from, since the revenue from safari hunting goes directly to the villagers. It would also have given incentives to the villagers to take care of the elephants and not poach, since they are the ones who have to live with the problems that the elephants cause. If local people know that they can earn money on the elephant legally by taking care of them instead of poaching, it will be easier for them to accept the presence of the elephants.

But, since Zambia is a party to CITES and the elephant is endangered on a *global* basis, there is no possibility of hunting elephants anywhere. The CITES system does not give room for diversifying different countries or areas, which means that no matter how much the number of elephants grows in one area, even if it becomes a problem of too many, they can't be hunted. Some have argued that this functions as a punishment instead of a reward for those who manage to make the conservation efforts so successful that the number of elephants grows (<http://www.iucn.org>).

However, there have been some changes during the last years; a one-off sale of confiscated ivory was allowed by CITES in 1999. The effects of this is discussed, and there are very different opinions about how it affects the level of poaching among other things, but the IUCN reports from the CITES COP 12⁷⁵, that no relationship has been established between the one-off sale and illegal activity in killing and trade (http://www.iucn.org/info_and_news/press/afelephant.pdf). Since the amount of elephants has become so large that it has become a problem in several areas, four countries – South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe – proposed to lift the ban on trade in ivory at the COP meeting in 2000. In addition, at the last COP meeting in 2002, Zambia also proposed a lift of the ban (ens-news.com 2002)⁷⁶. South-Africa, Botswana and Namibia were given permission; Zambia and Zimbabwe were turned down.

The situation is thereby the same in Zambia, since a down-listing of the elephant from appendix 1, under which trade is prohibited, to appendix 2 under which trade could be allowed, was not approved (*ibid.*) The secretary-general of CITES, Willem Wijnstekers, stated that while richer countries can often afford to promote conservation through strict protection, many poorer nations need to do it in ways which benefit local communities and bring in much-needed cash for conservation (<http://ens-news.com/ens/nov2002/2002-11-12-01.asp>). Wijnstekers continued to say that in Africa, a conservation strategy based on sustainable use may offer the best solution (*ibid.*). He thus supported the Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) strategy that SLAMU is based on, but the CITES COP-meeting still decided not to let Zambia trade in ivory. One reason for this is probably that the administrative system on national level is not trusted (Child: Jan. 2003 [e-mail]). Zambia also has relatively low elephant populations and a long history of poaching (*ibid.*) If ZAWA manages to establish a stable system of management – which includes that the other Managements Units in time reach the level of SLAMU,

⁷⁵ COP = Conference of the Parties (to the convention) number 12.

⁷⁶ The Environment News Service (ENS) is a daily international wire service of the environment. Established in 1990 by Editor-in-Chief Sunny Lewis and Managing Editor Jim Crabtree, it is independently owned and operated. It exists to present late-breaking environmental news in a fair and balanced manner. ENS is indexed by Reuters Business Briefing, Dow Jones Factiva, and the London Financial Times.

and that CBNRM programmes are legally established in all Units – there is great potential for the number of elephants to stabilise and for Zambia to develop on profits from tourism⁷⁷.

4.4 The importance of surrounding conditions for SLAMU.

As mentioned in 2.5.4, it is necessary to look at the surrounding conditions when trying to understand SLAMU. Zambia's overall decentralisation strategy, the national political situation, and international conventions that Zambia is a party to, are all influencing, to different extents, the way SLAMU is functioning. In addition, the funding from NORAD and its influence has been very important. The roles of the conventions have already been dealt with above, and other aspects will be analysed in the sub-sections of this chapter. For general economic conditions, see section 2.1.1.

4.4.1 Zambian national political situation and the decentralisation strategy

The different central authorities which have been governing Zambia, both colonial and after independence, have all had 'policies of decentralisation' (Ribot 2002, Braathen 2002). The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) also involves decentralisation (Crook & Manor 2001: 2). This would have been positive for LIRD/SLAMU if the policies had been followed up properly. However, central authorities have earlier on departed from the decentralisation policy by centralising government functions, and the current government has so far failed to deliver a national decentralisation policy, which has been due since the 'final draft' appeared in March 1997 (Braathen 2002:38). NORAD (2001: 8) writes that "the decentralisation has proceeded at an unsatisfactory pace". In addition to the lacking decentralisation strategy, reasons for the pace of decentralisation can include the central governments lack of political commitment in two other ways;

⁷⁷ See also Sele (2002) *Zambia*. Yearbook 2002-2003, The Norwegian Council for Africa.

- Through their failure to deliver full counterpart funding to all relevant (mainly donor-funded) development programmes, like SLAMU, and
- Failure to develop an integrated and legally based system of local government, including sub-district structures (ibid.).

These features of the governance system affect SLAMU in several ways; first, because the Unit receives very little in financial support from the GRZ (Child Dec. 2002 [e-mail]). Second, the local government bodies are so weak that they are not able to fulfil their obligations (Braathen 2002, Crook & Manor 2001, and FODEP 99-00). These obligations are therefore ‘transferred’ to SLAMU, in that local people complain to them and expect them to relieve the situation, although it is outside their mandate at present. Local Councils have been weakened financially, administratively and politically. This has happened through: 1) drainage of their revenue base, 2) penetration of central government on local levels and 3) reduction in formal authority (Crook & Manor 2001: 13, Braathen 2002: 36). All of this has weakened the council to such a degree that they have lost legitimacy and are barely able to perform at all.

Because of this, SLAMU is spending resources on filling the gap by providing services that the local/provincial government bodies are supposed to carry out. Road maintenance is a good example, and it is something that SLAMU sees as very necessary to do, since they are so dependent on the roads. This makes it harder for them to become financially self-sustainable, which NORAD is requiring. The SLAMU vehicles also function partly as free ‘public transportation’ for the local people when they are out driving, since such a service doesn’t exist in the area, and the distances are vast.

ZAWA is also penetrated by the president, and ZAWA centrally does the same to SLAMU locally, so the intervention is repeated through all levels of the system. The central authorities seem very afraid of losing power and control over resources of any kind, and some of my informants even said that officials in central government bodies have been trying to destroy the project behind the scenes⁷⁸. One can question if the decentralisation strategy is genuine – maybe it has been formulated to increase

⁷⁸ The sources will not be listed because they were interviewed under confidentiality.

state legitimacy and/or because donors value it? The decentralisation policy has been initiated from above, and it has been stated that a partial explanation for lack of real decentralisation is that the motivation has not been to empower local self-government. Many central government agents fear, and therefore block decentralisation, because it could undermine their own state power and central control (Ribot: 2002, Eriksen et. al in Braathen 2002: 23).

NORAD has expressed support to the decentralisation policy of Zambian central authorities, so it seems that they are interpreting the 'final draft' as a proper policy, *or* they are showing support to decentralisation to influence GRZ, and hope that it will lead to an enactment of the policy. NORAD is expecting that the issue of decentralised versus centralised management models will be the most difficult question in the dialogue on possible future support to the Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) (Grøva: 2002 Yearly Review Meeting and [e-mail]). Child also considers this a very important question, and the centralisation tendency in ZAWA is seen as problematic by both of them (Grøva and Child 2002 [interviews], Child 2002, Grøva and Child [e-mails]). The community programme⁷⁹ is crucial for the general development in the project area⁸⁰, and it would benefit from a continued and improved decentralisation policy, not a more centralised management model for wildlife.

Siame has written a paper on how to strengthen local government in Zambia (Siame 2000). He argues that a decentralisation policy is needed, to provide direction and a framework for development of local governance. However, I find his argumentation a bit ambiguous. First, local councils are seen as the *only* representative body in the district (ibid: 2). He writes:

It is the local council, alone, which has the people's mandate to run the affairs of their communities in the district on their behalf (ibid.).

Later on he argues that the traditional rulers, the chiefs, should be included when considering the role of institutional structures in local government development (ibid:

⁷⁹ See section 1.3 and footnote 18.

⁸⁰ The revenue which is used by the CBOs in community project have brought school buildings, teachers' houses, toilet buildings, water wells and more. These organisations have received training from the community programme under SLAMU

5). The reasons given are that these institutions have a longer history, and that local people tend to be more loyal to them. He maintains that the State has undermined the chiefs after Zambia's independence in 1964, but that "the new MMD government is finally giving them back some of the dignity that they deserve" (ibid.). Siame doesn't say anything about *why* chiefs deserve dignity, or *why* people are loyal to them. The last mentioned can be just as much out of fear as out of respect, and the reasons why chiefs are in their positions, and therefore their legitimacy, vary a lot.

The opposite view concerning the chiefs is argued by Ribot (Ribot 2002). He maintains that colonial powers, the state after independence and donors, have all contributed to a strengthening of the chiefs' positions (ibid: 73). The reasons why they are in these positions can date back to pre- colonial or colonial time, where chiefs came to their positions through rights of conquest, descent from ruling ancestors, membership in a ruling family, or because they were appointed by colonial powers from positions like soldiers or cooks (ibid: 73-74). Some were even appointed in areas they didn't belong to⁸¹. Ribot has several reasons for caution when it comes to empowerment of chiefs; the fact that chiefs are not necessarily representative or even liked, and that working with them may not serve the efficiency, equity or development aims so often forwarded by decentralisation advocates (ibid: 77). In addition he points out some facts which are even mentioned by Siame (Siame 2000); that the chiefs are not democratically elected, that they are not obligated (legally or morally) to consider the people's expressed wishes when making decisions, and that they often govern by decree (ibid: 5). Siame only suggests one solution to this problem, to make the chiefs aware of human rights issues, without specifying who should have the responsibility for the raising of this awareness (ibid.). Some chiefs deserve respect for doing a good job as local leaders, but there are also many who are despots (see Ribot 2002: 76). Therefore, from a democratic point of view, it will not be a strengthening of local government or local democracy to include chiefs in local governance with their current ambiguous legitimacy. If they had been democratically elected however, it would have been an entirely different matter.

⁸¹ For further arguments see Ribot 2000:pp73-77, where he also refers to several other sources.

The experiences from South Luangwa show that some of the chiefs embezzled, and that some didn't consider the general well-being of the people, but only tried to get as much as possible out of the co-operation with LIRD for themselves. As mentioned in section 2.5.3, this was the main reason why the main contact point was changed from the chiefs to the lowest level of CBOs, the VAGs (NORAD ZAM 044 archive documents, Larsen 2002 [interview]). This has contributed to greater transparency, the members of the CBOs are democratically elected, everybody in the villages can be part of the decisions on how to spend the money, and awareness of rights among people have increased (Chimba 2002 [interview], workshop observations 2002).

Siame doesn't mention the possible role of CBOs or NGOs at all, but this is done by the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP)⁸². In a Resource Manual for District Councillors (1999-2000: 25), it is written:

The Organisation of the government administration at district level will involve the following:

- 1) The District Administrators office
- 2) Government line departments
- 3) Semi-autonomous Institutions
- 4) Local Authority
- 5) NGOs, co-operating partners and CBOs
- 6) District Development Co-ordinating Committee (DDCC).

This indicates that donors, NGOs and CBOs are seen as part of the formal governance system! There is also an appendix with an organisational chart showing this feature. However, the role of the 5th group on the list of government administration is not specified further, which makes it very difficult to understand how the system is understood by FODEP and how it (is supposed to) work. Maybe this can be partly explained by the important role played by donors, NGOs (and CBOs) in general development ventures⁸³? In a country where the state's budget is

⁸² FODEP is a voluntary NGO working for the promotion and protection of the democratisation process in Zambia, registered under the Societies' Act of Zambia in 1992. It is the successor of the Zambia Elections Monitoring and Co-ordinating Committee (ZEMCC) which was a conglomerate of civil society organisations and interest groups formed to monitor Zambia's first round of Multi-Party elections in 1991.

⁸³ See section 4.4.2, especially citation on p.85

fifty per cent donor financed, it can be understandable that (the role of) donors is not properly separated from the Zambian governance system, although this must be seen as a misunderstanding.

After the problem with chiefs' embezzlement was solved, the most severe problems for SLAMU have been due to different kinds of interference, directly and indirectly, mainly from central authorities. The most extreme indirect example was when the former president, F. Chiluba banned all hunting (Grøva: 2002 [interview], Child:2002 [interview], several SLAMU employees:2002 [interviews]). This seriously affected SLAMU and the local people who gained revenue from the safari hunting, people became more negative towards the project and the community programme especially, since the most important financial source had been taken away by the ban (e.g. Chimba: 2002 [interview], Kamwendo 2002 [interview]). This is a good example of how central authorities can rip away the foundation for local development work. Even if the local project functions, it is often dependent on central politics and a certain degree of good-will, and is thereby vulnerable. Many SLAMU employees indicated that they need NORAD's protection. As long as NORAD is partially funding SLAMU, central authorities will not have the possibility to undermine the project or take resources from it. This will be further discussed in the next sub-section, 4.6.2. There are also examples of direct central interference. Whenever the regional manager of SLAMU makes a decision which is not popular with the director of ZAWA, or the president, they intervene (Yearly Review Meeting and several interviews 2002). This undermines the authority of the regional manager, it makes it difficult for him to make decisions and stand for them, the local people question how much their so-called management responsibility for the natural resources really counts, and it makes them sceptical and pessimistic (observations from fieldwork and Yearly Review Meeting, Grøva:2002, [interview], Chimba:2002 [interview]). Another example which illustrates the interfering of central authorities was a complaint put forward by a chief at the Yearly Review Meeting. When there are problem animals destroying local farmers' crop fields, instead of being able to send someone to deal with it straight away (like LIRDPA apparently were able to do before), the SLAMU management has to contact ZAWA centrally to ask what they

can to do with it. From what the chief said as a spokesman for all the others, it could take weeks before anything happened. It is a matter of dividing responsibilities and decentralising what is functionally done better and quicker locally than centrally. This is a question of deconcentration of power, which as mentioned above, is something ZAWA has a problem with.

The national political situation has fluctuated during the 16 years⁸⁴ history of LIRD/SLAMU. It is argued that a decentralisation system must have been in operation for at least ten to fifteen years in a financially and politically stable situation, before one is able to fairly evaluate its success or failure (Crook and Sverrisson 1999: 5). Most projects are evaluated and criticised before they have had a real chance to get the wheels rolling properly, and it is impossible to measure the performance before it has been tried properly (Crook and Sverrisson 1999: 5, Ribot 2002: 2). Crook & Sverrisson also say that in cases of changing or abandoning decentralisation projects after only a few years or one electoral cycle, the projects won't be able to show results which can be fairly judged (*ibid.*)

If this is extended, one can look at the effect change of central government has on a decentralisation project even if it is not abandoned or changed *officially*. After the elections in Zambia in 1991, LIRD was not changed, but NORAD experienced that the new government had a hidden agenda (NORAD ZAM 044 archive). They saw the project as the former president Kaunda's 'baby', since he had been personally engaged from the beginning, and had overruled the Ministry in cases where LIRD came into trouble with it. In addition, several have mentioned in interviews that many were envious of the development that happened in South Luangwa. These people also considered the project as highly favoured by Kaunda and NORAD, and tried to sabotage it. In this period, there were substantial problems between NORAD and the central authorities. The Zambian authorities said in meetings that they were happy for NORAD's support to LIRD and that they were positive to the continuing development of the project (NORAD ZAM 044 archive). A short time after, and in total contradiction to what they had said, NORAD received messages from LIRD staff that the licence of the safari company of the project had not been renewed

(ibid.). This and other incidences obviously created considerable problems for LIRDP, and also indicates that the assumption made by Eriksen et. al. on central authorities' motivation for decentralisation is highly convincing in this case. But, with the personal engagement of several of the employees and NORAD's support, the project endured.

Later on, both LIRDP staff and NORAD realised that LIRDP had become a mini-government which was hard to manage. Reaching financial self-sustainability which was a goal from the beginning was impossible (Grøva 2002 [interview], Child 2002 [interview]). The budgeting and other things went out of hand, which ultimately lead to reorganisation in 1996. This is a clear case of crisis-lead reorganisation, which made it possible to make substantial changes in a short period of time, whilst in other cases where there is no crisis; reorganisation will normally be more incremental (Kjellberg & Reitan: 1995). NORAD had previously warned against too much focus on the wildlife management, which was the most successful part of the project. However, they showed ability to learn and in this case adopted a process oriented approach to the implementation, which meant that the sub-goals were partially changed. Child has supported this approach (2002 [interview]), which also seems to be corresponding to the way things are usually done in NORAD. When deciding which projects to support and on the main goals, they are clear and decision oriented, but the sub-goals are subject to learning processes and adjustments according to the situations in the countries NORAD work in (NORAD employee 2003 [interview]).

The fact that one is dealing with official institutions with different degrees of inertia means that patience is important. In addition, ZAWA is a new institution, and it is parastatal, which gives them special challenges in that many of the employees used to work in the NPWS, ZAWA's predecessor.

⁸⁴ See 2.5.2

4.4.2 The significance of NORAD for SLAMU

NORAD's presence and partial financing of SLAMU have always been important. Absolutely all interviews in Zambia indicate that without NORAD's patience, it would never have worked out so well, or maybe not at all. The second secretary at the Norwegian embassy also confirmed that the project has always been looked upon as very interesting and important by the employees at the embassy, including the former second secretaries and ambassadors (Grøva 2002 [interviews]). A former adviser at SLAMU and currently freelance consultant to NORAD, was also impressed by the involvement and commitment showed, he stated:

“NORAD was flexible, small, and handled the programme nimbly, and with knowledge. I don't have to tell you how rare this is with donors. LIRD was lucky that they got a series of exceptional desk officers and ambassadors, but this was more luck than built into NORAD's make-up” (Child: Nov. 2002 [e-mail]).

This feature of commitment has had a very positive effect on SLAMU. It shows how important individuals can be, and that institutional theory which disregards human agency, will lose a very important aspect. Within 'New Institutionalism' different approaches emphasise the influence of individuals differently. The normative institutionalism approach emphasises what they call 'the logic of appropriateness', which defines what behaviour is appropriate for members of an institution (Peters 1999:35, March & Olsen 1998: 948). For the logic of appropriateness to be effective, there must be some form of enforcement (Peters 1999: 35), and from the normative institutionalism point of view, socialisation functions as a sanction and enforcement process.

It seems, from the interviews and impressions of NORAD, that the socialisation is stronger at the head office than at the embassy. It is natural that individuals play a larger role in small institutions than in large ones, or in smaller (relatively autonomous) offices than in larger ones, also because there are bigger changes in personnel and more often changes. An example is to what degree the recipient responsibility is emphasised; it seems that it is stronger at the head office in Oslo than at the embassy. This is interesting when considering that the embassy relates more directly and more often with the representatives of the recipient than the head office

in Oslo. It indicates that it is easier to hold on to a principle when further away from the realities of the recipient countries. In addition, the emphasis on recipient responsibility is seen by some as shovelling the responsibility over to the developing country, which is expressed to a further extent by people who have experience from an embassy than those who don't.

The focus of the recipient responsibility principle seems to be more on 'recipient' than 'responsibility' (Munyenyebe et. al: 113-114). It is important to remember that NORAD needs to be responsible too, which should include demands of accountability. According to Munyenyebe et. al. (2000) and Child & Bergström (2001), clearer borders and demands for accountability from NORAD were part of what made the project more successful. It seems that many in NORAD think that it would undermine the recipient if NORAD is more involved, but it is important to remember the opposite view - that it can be rewarding to be held accountable, as it is inspiring to work in an environment where people care about whether the work is done well or not⁸⁵.

Another thing which was mentioned, was that NORAD in comparison with the EU, is much quicker in dealing with emergencies and the transfer of funds to projects (Mwamba: 2002 [interview]). Mr. Mwamba had experience from working on different donor funded projects in Zambia, and therefore had the possibility to compare. This is another positive feature of NORAD, which I could see was important during my fieldwork. The transfer of funding from NORAD had never been a problem. Both former and current NORAD employees at the head office in Oslo have also stated that there is emphasis on a low degree of bureaucratisation and quick transfers of funds, and this seems to function well. However, it must be part of the 'evaluation' that the comparison is made mainly to the EU, which is a larger institution and is in general considered highly bureaucratic.

The transfer of wages from ZAWA to SLAMU however, had been a problem for some months when I was there. It was naturally a heavy drain on SLAMU

⁸⁵ This view is supported by what Munyenyebe et. al 2000 writes, by Child 2002 [interview].

employees' personal funds as well as their patience and work energy. This problem was one of the main reasons for the negativity towards ZAWA. NORAD could help ease this problem by funding and other assistance to ZAWA head office, something which is being considered. Child (2002) is recommending that NORAD support ZAWA in his assessment of the sector, although with certain conditions like emphasis on capacity-building⁸⁶.

NORAD is seen as a protector by many SLAMU employees, which is not hard to understand. A good example came forward at the Yearly Review Meeting, where it was questioned why some NORAD funded SLAMU vehicles - which had been taken to the ZAWA head office in Lusaka a long time ago- had not been returned. It was explained that a British donor NGO had decided to fund the overhaul of the vehicles and that as soon as this was finished, they would be returned. As long as NORAD is a partner and the agreement between the governments of Norway and Zambia is on direct funding of SLAMU, ZAWA can't legitimately transfer resources from SLAMU to the head office or other management units. With the difficulties in the history of the project, it is understandable that the SLAMU staff become sceptical.

From NORAD's point of view it is also understandable that they are seen as protectors, but in addition they find it problematic. What will happen when NORAD pulls out? It has been clear from the beginning that they are not going to be there forever, even though the partnership has lasted longer than planned. Several of the employees have misunderstood NORAD's role. It seems that NORAD is juxtaposed with ZAWA in that NORAD is seen as, and wanted as main 'supervisor' instead of ZAWA. They are not considering the fact that NORAD is not part of the Zambian governance system. The understanding of the role of donors is a problem also outside SLAMU, among others in FODEP, where donors are seen as part of the governance system in Zambia⁸⁷. I got a strong impression that this phenomenon is due to the long time presence of donors and their extensive significance and influence. One good example from SLAMU:

⁸⁶ See Child (2002) Background Assessment of the Wildlife Sector, Draft Report, sept.2002

⁸⁷ See previous section 4.4.1 pp81-82.

“With the transformation to ZAWA, nothing is operating the way it was before. ZAWA is also diverting resources like vehicles and money, which is a breach of the NORAD/GRZ agreement. They should stop violating the agreement and leave the resources in the project area, - if only an independent management employed by NORAD could run the project, not those employed by ZAWA” (SLAMU employee 2002 [interview]).

This statement shows how NORAD is seen as the ‘good protector’ against the ‘bad violator’ ZAWA. As an outsider considering viewpoints from SLAMU, NORAD and ZAWA, I am more optimistic. There are grounds for a good co-operation between NORAD and ZAWA, but the relationship between these two institutions is ambivalent. They communicate well, but have some fundamental disagreements on ownership of natural resources, especially the hunting, and as mentioned above, the centralisation issue (Grøva Nov. 2002 [e-mail]). Grøva is also unsure of how much ZAWA appreciates NORAD’s views, but believes that they are seen as a better donor partner than many of the other ones. Reasons for this are like Child and Mwamba have mentioned in interviews – that they are less bureaucratic, quick with transfers of funds and dealing with emergencies, are knowledgeable and show genuine interest and commitment (Child 2002 [interview and e-mail], Mwamba 2002 [interview], Grøva 2002 [interview and e-mail]).

ZAWA staff off course say that they have a good relationship with NORAD (Mushinge 2002 [interview]), and the disagreement on some issues were not mentioned. Mr. Mushinge highlighted that ZAWA has a warm and fruitful relationship with NORAD, he said:

They supported us when no other donors would touch us, and have contributed to transparency in that all money has to be accounted for” (ibid.).

It is fortunate for SLAMU that NORAD has decided to fund another phase. First, it gives SLAMU another chance to become financially self-sustainable. Second, NORAD can still support if any problems should arise with ZAWA, which is not unlikely. NORAD has understanding for the problems SLAMU has had with ZAWA lately, and thinks it is due to the re-centralisation and increasingly detailed control by ZAWA (Grøva Nov. 2002 [e-mail]). They are however going to consider the funding of ZAWA, but have together with other donors decided that some criteria on the

disputed issues⁸⁸ have to be set up before funding is possible. To make sure that the decentralisation of management responsibility and the ownership of natural resources is not withdrawn by central authorities, it would be recommendable for NORAD to stay in the partnership with SLAMU until these features of the wildlife management are unquestionably legally secured. Currently, legal status of the CBOs is not secured, because the ADCs in the area have not been replaced with CRBs, which will have a legal status as corporate bodies in the Wildlife Act of 1998.

If the CRBs are established and this system is spread to the other Management Units under ZAWA, NORAD will undoubtedly have contributed to a far-reaching democratising change of the wildlife management in the whole of Zambia. Local corporate bodies will be able to manage 'their own' wildlife, and the democratic features of the system can contribute to a change in attitudes and a strengthening of the people's participation in the government system in general.

Crook and Manor (2001: 1) have a list of larger purposes that democratic decentralisation usually serves, which can show the effects a spread of this system can have. I will mention the ones which can already be seen in South Luangwa;

1) more sustainable development projects 2) greater participation and associational activity, 3) greater accountability, 4) greater transparency, 5) break down of citizens' apathy about government and development, and 6) easing of the burden on donors and central government. The other aspects on the list⁸⁹ are more directly connected to formal governance bodies in general, e.g. District - or City Council, or Province government. The improvement of these bodies can be an indirect effect of the improvement in the wildlife management sector, as mentioned, if the SLAMU model is spread to the other units under ZAWA across the country.

⁸⁸ Mainly the centralisation vs. decentralisation issue on ownership of natural resources.

⁸⁹ See Crook and Manor 2001.

4.5 Is SLAMU a decentralisation venture?

The lack of a ‘theory’ to explain when, how, and why to decentralise has been important...(in explaining why decentralisation efforts are) generalised, superficial, and, not surprisingly, largely ineffective.

(Wunsch 1991: 15, cited in Cohen & Peterson 1999: 19).

There are many different theoretical definitions and types of decentralisation. Some scholars use the same words but ascribe different meanings to them, and what is called decentralisation and not, also vary. The approaches used in this study are described in section 3.1.1.

It is important to describe and define a system in order to know what we are dealing with. Characterising decentralisations illustrates the degree to which decentralisations are actually taking place, exploring the difference between discourse and practice (Ribot 2002a: iv). In addition, it will be easier for outsiders to understand, be able to learn from, and use the experiences made. That way a system, or parts of it, can be tested further in other areas. It is also important to remember that decentralisation is essentially about distribution of power and resources. Therefore, such schemes cannot be treated as technically neutral devices which can be ‘implemented’ without constraint, as if there were no pre-existing social context (Crook & Sverrisson 2002: 2). Many see it as a question of loosing or gaining power and resources, and not as a strengthening of all levels like the advocates of decentralisation maintain (Crook & Manor 2001, Ribot 2002, Johnson 2001).

The actors which are currently involved in the management of natural resources to different degrees are; ZAWA/SLAMU, local communities via VAGs and ADCs (future CRBs), and the local council. I will go through these actors’ roles, but let us first have a quick look at the period before some of these actors were established.

The formal governance system in Zambia is still weak (Siame: 2000, Crook & Manor 2001, Braathen 2002), and the eastern province is no exception. LIRDP, SLAMU’s predecessor, did not contribute much to its improvement since it was an autonomous project outside the local governance system. If anything, LIRDP contributed to a further weakening of the legitimacy of the District Council and Line

Ministries, in that it took over service provision from them which they were unable to handle with so little resources. LIRDP provided public services better than the government bodies, but can hardly be called a decentralisation venture in a formal or strict theoretical sense. From the overview in 3.1.1, the definitions which are wide enough to include LIRDP are Rondinelli's general decentralisation definition and Ribot's devolution, the last being considered too wide by Ribot himself (2002: v). I share his view, and think that for any scheme to be called *democratic* decentralisation, it cannot entail any form of privatisation. This is because privatisation of public services will not transfer power and resources to a democratically elected entity and it does not necessarily improve the local (administrative) governance system⁹⁰.

Decentralisation within a governance system – in a strict formal or a wider but still public sense – is supposed to strengthen both the central and local governance. As shown with the example of LIRDP, although that was not formally a full privatisation, local governance will not be strengthened by such measures outside the formal system. Decentralisation is supposed to make the system able to perform with appropriate roles at multiple levels, and support the objectives of national unification, democratisation, and greater efficiency and equity in the use of public resources and service delivery (Ribot 2002: iv). It is not hard to understand that this didn't happen when the roles were so unclear; there were no efforts to include LIRDP in the existing system, or to strengthen the existing local government units.

The change of the project into SLAMU has led to an inclusion in the new formal governance system for natural resources. The former National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) was reorganised into the parastatal Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) and SLAMU was placed under it as a territorial sub-unit. The SLAMU

⁹⁰ Privatisation *can* strengthen the governance systems by lessening the burden on them, but it is far from guaranteed - neither is equity. The main reason for privatising is usually a response to donors in fulfilling structural adjustment plans which involves building down the state administration. The idea is that competition will bring cheaper and more efficient service delivery.

employees are now ZAWA employees and get their salaries from ZAWA, instead of through funding from NORAD⁹¹.

In trying to define ZAWA, the problem is that the role of this entity is unclear. Even though it is said to be a parastatal, it seems to function just like a regular state agency in relation to the central government. An example is that the president of the Republic intervenes in the decisions made by the Director General of ZAWA (anonymous 2002 [interview]). ZAWA is having problems with establishing its organisation properly, which is partly because it is hit hard by political interference, something which also happens with parastatals in Zimbabwe (National Report: 20.03.03). It seems that the only reason why the central government has made ZAWA and other entities parastatal is to please donors, although this does not necessarily involve NORAD (See footnote 88).

When trying to analyse actors in defining to what degree a decentralisation is actually taking place, it is important to have this aspect of national policies in mind. Zambian central authorities are trying to satisfy international donors by having a policy which is the basis for implementing structural adjustment measures⁹². Privatisation and decentralisation are parts of this. However, it might very well be that they are trying to make the efforts look like privatisation and decentralisation without that really being the case, or that they are making it difficult for the local units to use the powers they are supposed to have been given. The half-privatisation of ZAWA and the powers it is supposed to have been given – including the powers and autonomy of the territorial management units – is an example of this. Currently ZAWA has its head office just outside the capital Lusaka, and can as such only be seen as a non-territorial deconcentration. This will be the situation until the territorial sub-units are strengthened, since SLAMU is the only management unit which functions relatively well. According to the commercial director at ZAWA, Mr.

⁹¹ See further discussion of NORAD's role in sub-section 4.4.2 above and section 4.6 below.

⁹² Cohen & Peterson (1999:28) write: "In the early 1980s it was not uncommon for a given government to have established and delegated authority to hundreds of such semi-autonomous organisations. Since then, fully privatising such organisations has been a major objective of aid agency structural adjustment conditions".

Mushinge, “SLAMU is miles ahead of the other management units” (2002: [interview])⁹³.

The decentralisation definition that fits best for SLAMU, is Rondinelli’s version of administrative decentralisation, which he calls delegation. Delegation is defined as a more extensive form of decentralisation, where central government transfers responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central government but ultimately accountable to it (1999: 3). At least this was the case when LIRDP changed name to SLAMU and was incorporated in the system under ZAWA. As mentioned above, there has been a centralisation tendency lately, and more detailed control by ZAWA HQ is undermining the authority of SLAMU. Hopefully this tendency will be reversed again so that SLAMU can continue fulfilling its established role in the CBNRM efforts. The way it used to be from the reorganisation in 19996 to the incorporation in ZAWA in 2000, the powers they had been given and the accountability made the Unit function well.

The community-based organisations (CBOs) in South Luangwa – Village Action Groups (VAGs), and Area Development Committees (ADCs) – are difficult to define. There has definitely been a transfer of decision-making power in the form of management responsibility and resources in the shape of revenue from hunting, but the members of the CBOs are not civil servants, like Eriksen et. al demands in their definition of deconcentration⁹⁴. The CBOs degree of autonomy can be discussed, since they have to report to ZAWA through SLAMU on the use of wildlife revenue, but are not formal sub-units under SLAMU or ZAWA so far. They get the revenue from the hunting in the GMA through the accountants at SLAMU. On the release of new funds, reports and accounts of previously released funds are given to SLAMU (Grøva: Jan. 2003 [e-mail]). Besides the reporting on use of revenue, they are not upwards accountable. The downwards accountability is well established and will be discussed below.

⁹³ As mentioned in sub-section 4.4.2 NORAD is considering funding ZAWA more extensively than just SLAMU. This will be an important part of making sure that what has been accomplished by SLAMU is sustained over time and that resources are not taken from SLAMU and distributed to the other sub-units in the name of equalisation and redistribution. This will be summed up in chapter 5.

The CBOs also co-operate with the staff at the CBNRM section under SLAMU, but there is no hierarchy, the CBNRM-section has no superior or responsible position in relation to the CBOs. The section provides civic education and holds workshops on governance, land use, accounting, and related issues. This means that the role of SLAMU beyond the demand for reporting on use of funds is advisory and related to capacity training (e.g. accounting skills) (ibid, Boje 2000: 4).

What makes the CBOs a very interesting case, is the characteristics which are so important in political/democratic decentralisation, namely representability of - and downwards accountability to local people, and public participation in local decision-making. These are all covered by the function of the CBOs, as opposed to the customary authorities, the chiefs. It can therefore be argued that the decentralisation to the CBOs is of political type, that is, in accordance with the definitions of political or democratic decentralisation by Ribot (Ribot 2002) and Braathen/Eriksen et. al. (Braathen 2002). But, there is one important aspect which is missing – the legal basis of the CBOs. Without a legal basis the decentralised rights can be taken away by central authorities at a whim⁹⁵ (Ribot 2002a: 41 & 2002b: 1). This has been a problem in other African countries where local people have felt so insecure about their rights that it has lead to over-exploitation of natural resources in order to use as much as possible because they expected the right to be taken away from them (Ribot 2002b). Even if this has not happened in South Luangwa, the example shows that the means of transfer must be secured.

This issue is however being dealt with, as the ADCs will be replaced with or made into Community Resources Boards (CRBs), to strengthen the legal status of these CBOs as wildlife managers. The CRBs are based in the Zambia Wildlife Act (ZWA) from 1998 as local communities with common interest in the wildlife and natural resources in the area. They are to be comprised of; seven to ten representatives of the local community, one representative of the chief in whose area the board is, and one representative of the local authority in the area (ZWA 1998: 17-18). This indicates a formalisation and inclusion of the local formal authority and the customary authority,

⁹⁴ In Braathen 2002:22.

⁹⁵ Although this will not happen as long as NORAD is a party and functions as a watchdog, See subsection 4.4.2.

which is positive, especially since the chiefs themselves are to be patrons. This means that they are not regular members like the democratically, direct and indirect, elected representatives of the local community, but function more as advisers. Integration between the different entities and levels can contribute to less hostility and better co-operation towards the mutual goal of development.

The wildlife act, like any other law, is open for interpretation. This means that it can be problematic that the Minister (of Tourism, environment and Natural Resources) and the Authority (ZAWA) is given so much power. An example of this can be found in part III subsection (2) where it says:

The Authority shall register as a board [...] and shall in consultation with that board, develop management plans for the Game Management Area or open area or any part thereof which is under its jurisdiction” (ZWA 1998: 17).

This can easily be interpreted as if the Authority has the main responsibility for the management plans and will only consult with the CRBs. It should however be the other way around, which would be in accordance with CBNRM principles no. 1), 4), 6) and 10)⁹⁶.

Another problem is that the VAGs are not specifically mentioned in the Act. From what Munyenymbe et. al. writes (2000) it seems that their interpretation of the ZWA is that the legal basis of VAGs is included in the legal basis of CRBs. It is excellent if it is included, but as long as it is not specifically stated it is unclear. Since the VAGs are the most important organisations because they function better than the ADCs as the main manager of wildlife⁹⁷, it is important to make sure that their legal basis is just as secure as that of the CRBs.

ADCs and VAGs currently have their own constitutions which function well although they have an unclear legal status (Chimba 2002 [interview], Munyenymbe et. al. 2000). People refer to the constitution and their rights and it has given the local people's institutions a real foundation (Munyenymbe et. al. 2000: 75). This can be compared with a case from Mali on forest management. Elected rural councillors lost patience in waiting for the government to transfer powers to them like they had

⁹⁶ See textbox in sub-section 3.1.1 above.

⁹⁷ See figures 2.2 and 2.3.

promised, and started protecting forests on their own (Ribot 2002b: 9). These two positive examples from Mali and Zambia show that much can happen without transferred powers and a secure legal basis. Although a legal basis is important in the long term, it might not be necessary to wait for it before starting developing a management plan and protecting natural resources. This shows that Ribot's view – "Transferring power without accountable representation is dangerous. Establishing accountable representation without powers is empty" (Ribot 2002: 2) – is too simplistic⁹⁸. Waiting for national authorities to comply and bring about an enabling framework when people are eager to contribute to a positive change, could be the same as giving up in certain cases. LIRD was established in difficult circumstances with extensive poverty and as a consequence of this, extensive poaching. But, the progress has been achieved by the project on its own, despite lack of national level support like clear supporting policies and laws (Child & Bergström 2001: 37).

Braathen and Ribot both define decentralisation as transfer of power and resources *within* an organisation (Braathen 2002, Ribot 2002a & b), but can it also be called decentralisation when it happens *between* organisations? The transfer of management responsibility for wildlife and the revenue from safari hunting – first from LIRD to the chiefs and thereafter from the chiefs to the CBOs – is an example of such a transfer. In the first case where the chiefs got the responsibility for the allocation of money from the hunting, it can not be seen as decentralisation within a democratic approach, because the chiefs are not elected by the local people. When it was realised that the chiefs also embezzled, the organisation was changed⁹⁹. Instead of the top-down approach a bottom-up approach was chosen, and amazingly they managed to convince the chiefs that the largest part of the money should be given to the VAGs instead of them.

Since the members of the CBOs are democratically elected by the local people, this feature of the CBOs distinguishes them from NGOs, where the members are not elected (Ribot 2002: 13). There is a higher probability that CBOs in general will be more transparent and generate a higher degree of participation by local people than

⁹⁸ Although he admits that even partial decentralisations have borne some positive social and environmental outcomes.

⁹⁹ See figure 2.2 in appendix 1.

NGOs. In addition, a CBO will have greater possibilities of creating long lasting sustainable development since it is so well integrated in the local community. An NGO on the other hand, can also be well established in a community, but can more easily withdraw from development projects and start with something else in a different area if there are any disagreements. The control with CBOs is necessarily higher, since they are based in a particular community and will not be able to withdraw to the extent an NGO can, especially if it is an NGO from the outside. For these reasons, decentralisation to CBOs, in any form, is seen as generally more advantageous than decentralisation to NGOs. CBOs should be categorised in a group of its own, not as a sub-group of NGOs like many authors seem to do. It is although not fully clear if it is CBOs they are writing about since they don't use that term. Community groups and community organisations are the terms used, which can just as well be interest groups which are not representative for the whole community

These CBOs at the lowest level of organisation are now responsible for administering the money, and meetings are held where all the villagers can participate and give their votes on how to allocate the money (Chimba 2002 [interview], Munyenyebe et al. 2000). The constitutions of the VAGs are strong on accountability and transparency and because they function so well, I will maintain that the transfer of responsibility and powers to these institutions can be formally defined as political decentralisation, as soon as the legal basis is secured.

Even if the role of the CBOs is the most important, the best will in most cases be collaboration. If the CBOs have the main responsibility, receive the revenue from and report to the authorities, in this case SLAMU/ZAWA, NGOs can bring specialised knowledge to the partnership. A good example is the current work on a Land Use Plan in the area, which is a co-operation between representatives of the CBOs, the CBNRM-section of SLAMU and WWF. NORAD is supporting it through partial funding, since it is a very important condition for the continued building of SLAMU housing for employees, and to get a holistic and long-term plan for the development in the whole area. The Land Use Plan is also a scheme to prevent building too close to the National Park, which could create conflicts.

4.6 The role of SLAMU and its CBNRM-programme for sustainable development and empowerment.

The questions I wished to answer in relation with the effects of SLAMU and its CBNRM-section was;

- First, will people be able to see that the prioritisation of natural resource conservation can lead to economic and social improvement in the long run?
- Second, to what extent and in which ways have Sustainable Development, CBD and CITES influenced the SLAMU project? How do they promote or hamper the project?
- Third is the decentralisation to SLAMU having any effect on local government?
- Fourth, how is the placement of SLAMU under ZAWA instead of NPWS affecting the decentralisation or the autonomy of SLAMU?
- Lastly, how has SLAMU in general and the community-programme more specifically affected local people?

We have already touched upon answers to all these questions above, but they will be elaborated on here, starting with an answer to the first, second and last question in combination, then the third and the fourth. The parts about the international conventions in question two have been answered above in section 4.3 and will not be elaborated on here.

It has taken time and a lot of effort, especially from the community programme employees, but most of the people in the project area have realised the benefits of conserving the wildlife (Munyenymbe et. al. 2000, Child & Bergstrøm 2001, WWF workshop 2002, SLAMU interviews 2002, village interviews 2002). The Community-based Natural Resource Management principles are the foundation of the education and knowledge the people have received through training from the community programme. The principles and thereby the training are in line with and can be seen as a part of the overarching concept Sustainable Development. As mentioned above, all the interviewees in Zambia expressed gratitude towards NORAD and said that without LIRD and later SLAMU, there would not have been

much going on in the area. The current tourism was made possible due to the establishment of LIRDPA which saved the animals people are coming to see in South Luangwa National Park. One said: “Without NORAD and LIRDPA, no animals, without animals, no tourism, and without tourism, no revenue and no development” (local villager 2002 [interview]). This statement is illustrative, although simplifying.

What LIRDPA/SLAMU has managed to do, is to save a very important basis for tourism and thereby for income. Besides SLAMU, the tourism industry through the lodges is the biggest employer, and most of the people who have a permanent job work either for the lodges or for SLAMU. Still, many people are without permanent employment, which makes their future very insecure. They live from day to day, hoping to get ‘piece works’ as they call it - which is short term employment like painting, carpentry, cleaning and so on. There is still a long way to go to reach the majority of the poor people in South Luangwa. The new cash distribution system – Tyolela¹⁰⁰ - is helping, but it is not enough to sustain large families, and it is seen by villagers as a disadvantage that it is only given out once a year (village group interview 2002).

At a planning workshop I attended, current problems were listed. Most of them were related to health and education, like lack of clinics and medicine, lack of teachers and teaching material, lack of secure water access, and lack of enough and quality housing to attract teachers and doctors. These problems are being dealt with indirectly by SLAMU through the revenue the villagers receive, and through the capacity building of the CBNRM-section. The revenue is used for community projects e.g. wells and housing, and the knowledge provided by the CBNRM-section is used by the villagers to organise themselves and demand their rights from chiefs and ZAWA. The knowledge is provided through workshops on organisation, financial and technical issues e.g. accounting and quota-setting.

The third question was about the autonomy of SLAMU now in relation to earlier. LIRDPA had a pilot project status for a long time, with strong direct support from Kaunda as long as he was President of the Republic (until 1991). It was placed under

¹⁰⁰ Tyolela is a local expression for the money received directly by persons or households. It refers to folded bank notes placed in the pocket (Chimba 2002 [interview] , Child & Dalal-Clayton 2001:21)

NPWS, but had a very autonomous position, partly because of the characteristics mentioned above, and because of a high level of NORAD funding. The Zambian central authorities were often asking questions about how long this so-called pilot project was supposed to last, and when it would be incorporated in the formal governance system. NORAD tried to drag out the 'pilot project' period because of distrust in the central bureaucracy, but could not express this distrust (anonymous 2002 [interview]). With change to SLAMU and the integration under ZAWA, some of the autonomy seems to have been lost, in that ZAWA's control is clearer and more detail-oriented¹⁰¹ After the reorganisation in 1996, however, the major problems have been handled; SLAMU has a clearer mandate, the institutional set-up has been strengthened and the participation has been widened. There is as far as I can see only one problem in relation to the mandate. As long as the Line Ministries are still not able to deliver basic services, there is constant pressure on SLAMU to provide some of them like it used to as LIRD¹⁰².

The most exciting effects of SLAMU from a political science point of view are the democratising so-called side-effects. These mechanisms were acknowledged as possible, positive side-effects of the project from the beginning, but were not among the main objectives. However, the wider institutional implications of SLAMU are several, as we have referred to briefly in the previous section, 4.5. First, the local authorities within other areas than wildlife, like water and education, have adopted the SLAMU model of organisation (Munyenye et. al. 2000). Second, it has been maintained that the current CBNRM policy of ZAWA would not have been possible without SLAMU (Regional Manager, Mr. Matokwani May 2002: CBNRM meeting). Matokwani also maintained that NORAD's financing and assistance in building the institution of SLAMU has been the basis for the establishment of ZAWA (ibid.). Third, the Forestry Department is working on legislation to empower community-based management of forest products and has visited the Project to learn from their guidelines and experience. Fourth, the European Union have expressed that they wish to try the SLAMU model in another part of Zambia, the Lower Zambezi (Mushinge

¹⁰¹ For more on this issue, see above in sub-section 4.4.2 and section 4.5.

¹⁰² This view is supported by the findings of Munyenye et. al 2000.

2002 [interview]). Last but not least, Mambwe District Council has expressed wishes to integrate the CBOs as Sub-Units of the Council, which can develop the local democracy.

According to Crook & Manor (2001: 33-34) a major weakness in the current governance system is the lack of legally constituted sub-district structures in the whole of Zambia. There are however unofficial ‘village development committees’ in some provinces ¹⁰³(ibid.), but the Eastern province is not mentioned as one of them. Since Crook & Manor don’t write anything about the function of these ‘village development committees’ it is difficult to compare them with the CBOs in South Luangwa (Crook & Manor 2001). From the name they can have similar functions as the ADCs and VAGs, but probably on a different basis than wildlife revenue. It is odd that the CBOs in the eastern province are not mentioned by Crook & Manor, since SLAMU is widely known. However, they write:

We do not recommend that Zambia follow the example of other countries which have experimented with direct representation of interest groups on councils by giving reserved seats to associations and NGOs. Apart from the problem of the ‘democratic credentials’ of such interest group representatives, this is a device which avoids rather than deals with the original problem: how to make the selection and election of councillors who should be representing whole communities and areas more effectively democratic and representative (Crook & Manor 2001: 32).

When it comes to the question of SLAMU’s effect on local governance, we have already mentioned in the section above, that LIRDPA took over service provision in the early phases and that way did not contribute towards making the local government better able to fulfil their ‘duties’. When it was decided to scale down LIRDPA, the responsibility for many functions was given back to Line Ministries without supporting them properly or doing it gradually. In the mean time, the Line Ministries had not become stronger or better fitted to deal with these assignments, and the result was that most of what had been built up by LIRDPA with funding from NORAD collapsed (Munyenye et. al. 2000). Mr. Klem at NORAD saw the possibility of this happening and wrote about his concerns to NORAD Lusaka in comments to “Fourth revised project submission for phase III” (NORAD note 16.10.94). He wrote that the period set aside for transfer of responsibility to the Line Ministries was too

short, and that substantial support would be needed – his advise was not followed up properly. Many of the sheds built for food storage for better food security were not maintained and the Women's Clubs which were seen as the only viable institutions in the community at the time, collapsed (Munyenembe et. al. 2000: 69).

In spite of failure on some areas by LIRD in the first phases, at least they were trying to take responsibility for service provision that the Line Ministries were not able to deal with (ibid: 62-63). The most important reasons for the failures were; the lack of a clear mandate, serious weaknesses in the institutional set-up and lack of real local participation through involvement (ibid: 68-69, Chimba 2002: [interview], Larsen 2002: [interview], LIRD project document # 14). The most important reason for the scaling down of the project was however the expenses – it was impossible to create enough revenue to sustain all the activities. Financial self sustainability is especially important to NORAD, and it was a goal from the beginning.

My interpretation is that what they call interest groups, including associations and NGOs, does not include CBOs, because CBOs *are* democratically elected by the people of the communities they represent¹⁰⁴. When seen this way, I agree with Crook & Manor that interest groups should not have seats in councils. CBOs can however contribute to a strengthening of the effectiveness of democratic local government by becoming formal sub-structures¹⁰⁵.

When former and current employees of SLAMU ([interviews]) were asked if they thought it would be a good idea to share the hunting revenue with the council to strengthen it, nobody thought so. They were highly sceptical and not willing to give the council another chance, since they had disappointed them earlier by not showing up for meetings and so on. This is an example which shows how little trust there is in formal government systems, like Crook & Manor (2001) and Siame (1998) also maintain. However, if the CBOs are integrated in the formal governance system as sub-units, this will mean that revenue will go automatically to the local government as CBOs turn into a part of it. The legal system for local government is however

¹⁰³ Crook & Manor 2001:34 "for example Southern, Western, Northern".

¹⁰⁴ For full description of VAGs and ADCs, see Munyenembe et. al. (2000) or Child & Dalal-Clayton (2001/2003).

intricate, which will make it difficult for Mambwe District Council to implement its plan. Both Crook and Manor (2001: 28) and Siame (1998: 6-7) indicate that changes of the legal basis of local government is needed.

To sum up, we can safely maintain that the current mandate of SLAMU functions well. It covers wildlife management in the National Park and contribution to empowerment of the people around the park. It has lead to a higher degree of participation, people are demanding their rights, and slowly the development is improving in the shape of better infrastructure, social services delivery, and small business ventures. In working by the principle “we bring only knowledge” the CBNRM-section contributes to a lessening of the former dependency and subservience culture (Munyenembe et. al. 2000). NORAD’s investments in this project over time has definitely brought better conditions for people and more sustainable use of natural resources, mainly wildlife.

¹⁰⁵ Crook & Manor have a list which shows how sub-district structures would help strengthen local government which includes; community participation, linkage for up- and downwards communication, resource channel, conflict mitigation between the multiplicity of levels. For full description see Crook & Manor 2001:33-37.

5. Conclusions and tentative recommendations

The main objective of this thesis has been to find out to what degree Norwegian Development Co-operation is in accordance with the concept of Sustainable Development. There were two main reasons for wanting to do research on this theme; first that Development Co-operation which disregards environmental issues can be undermining its own activities because development is often based on natural resources. Second, that Sustainable Development seemed to have lost political momentum. Therefore, I wished to find out if it was less important in NORAD now than it had been when the concept had a stronger position in society in general, that is at the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s.

It was also important for me to look at the actual impacts of NORAD's work on project level, not just to examine the strategies and guidelines. Therefore, I went to Zambia to study a NORAD supported project called South Luangwa Area Management Unit (SLAMU) to see what they were doing, what it meant for the development in the area and if they were working within a sustainable development approach.

What I have actually done is first to look at the importance of the mentioned concept for NORAD, by using Lafferty & Meadowcroft's definition of Sustainable Development to see **how Sustainable Development is used and if the three dimensions¹⁰⁶ within the concept are equally emphasised in NORAD.**

Second, the importance of the conventions for NORAD has been analysed through how they are mentioned in strategies, and how they are used by NORAD employees. The main question in relation to the conventions was: **To what extent and in which ways have CBD and CITES influenced NORAD's strategies and how are they used in the daily work?**

Third, the importance of the concept and conventions was considered at project level in a developing country, namely Zambia. A 'successful' development project

¹⁰⁶ The three dimensions are social development, economic development and environmental protection, and they are seen as interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of SD. See 2.1 for elaboration.

with basis in sustainable use of natural resources was chosen as study object, SLAMU. The main question was: **To what extent and in which ways have Sustainable Development, CBD and CITES influenced the SLAMU project? How do they promote or hamper the project?**

Fourth, I examined the institutional relationship between NORAD and SLAMU in light of institutional theory and implementation theory. I also wanted to see how the institutional relationship and their co-operation affected SLAMU's community-programme. Since Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) is promoted through the community-programme, and this is considered by NORAD as one of two areas within SLAMU where their main goals can be reached, namely empowerment and poverty reduction, it was important to see **how NORAD affected the community-programme.**

After summing up the findings and explanations, some contemplations will be made on the difficulties I encountered during the work with this thesis, what I have learned and how this knowledge can be used in the future.

5.1 On the integration of environment in NORAD

The use of the concept of Sustainable Development in NORAD is very closely linked to the problems they have had with the integration of environment. It is important to point out that I see social and economic development as just as important as the environment, but since they are fully integrated, that means institutionalised, in NORAD, the environment is 'the problem'. This only confirms what some have realised a long time ago, and therefore have been trying to integrate environment to get closer to sustainable development work.

Two questions were asked in section 1.2. When it comes to the question of right competence or will to integrate environment, there are clear indications from several interviewees that the competence wasn't, and still isn't sufficient, although it has been clearly improved over the twenty years since environment became part of NORAD's work. The second question was about the Minister of Development, Hilde Frafjord Johnson's expressed thoughts on the need to focus more thoroughly on the

connection between poverty and sustainable development. She expressed that this was needed when she took over the position as Minister, but, it has not resulted in any clear emphasis on this issue as far as I can see, which makes it an expressed ‘strategy’ which has not led to action.

I have read the relevant strategies of NORAD and interviewed NORAD employees on different levels to find out what kind of position the concept has today. As shown in chapter 4, the strategies have become weaker and weaker on this issue as time has passed from the report *Our Common Future* was published in 1987. With so much focus on social development and recipient responsibility in the main strategy¹⁰⁷, and nothing on the meaning of Sustainable Development or the *connection* between the three aspects, it is partially understandable that environmental factors are not properly integrated. There are of course other sources which contain references to Sustainable Development, but it can be overlooked when referring to the main strategy, since it is not properly integrated in it. In addition, the part of the internet pages which says what NORAD’s *main goal* is, does not even mention Sustainable Development and environment. If one looks further into the more specific areas of NORAD’s work listed on the internet pages, and also has a look on the specified strategies and work guidelines, it makes the situation somewhat better. The Director General was happy to be made aware of this, since it is important both that employees and ‘outsiders’ get the right impression of what is important to NORAD (Strand 2003 [interview]).

The understanding of concepts, in this case Sustainable Development, is important. It seems that it is not concrete enough for the employees, which means that it needs to be operationalised better. This is a common problem although it could be understood in a quite simple manner from *Our Common Future*, namely that all development should be within the borders of nature’s carrying capacity. If the understanding and use of the concept is the same, or at least very similar among the employees, *and* according to the strategies, there will be less criticism from the outside, and the development work will be more holistic.

¹⁰⁷ NORAD invests in the future – NORAD’s Strategy for 2000-2005.

There have been several evaluations of NORAD's performance on environment, I have looked at two of them; The Office of the Auditor General's investigation¹⁰⁸ of environmentally targeted development aid¹⁰⁹ from 2002 and the ProSus report by Skjønberg from 2000. The main findings of the Auditor General are that NORAD's follow-up and documentation of how environmental factors are integrated into development co-operation projects, has some serious deficiencies (Document no. 3:4 2002-2003) The audit revealed that environmental factors were touched upon in the preparatory phase, but otherwise in most of the projects which were investigated, there was little trace of environmental considerations in the documentation of the execution - and completion phases (Office of the Auditor General, press release 08.11.2002). It is clear in guideline documents on all levels that all NORAD financed projects shall be evaluated in relation to environmental consequences (Auditor General Document no. 3: 4 2002-2003: 38). The degree of involvement and follow-up has to be considered in relation to the recipient country's capacity and context, but there is no doubt about the Norwegian responsibility to control that environmental considerations have been attended to (ibid.).

Skjønberg's conclusions in the Prosus report from 2000 can be seen as part of an explanation to the findings of the Auditor General's audit. This is because Skjønberg found that environmental considerations were not properly integrated in NORAD, and the way the offices were organised, didn't harmonise with the goal of integration (Skjønberg 2000). The re-organisation in 2001 didn't make any changes related to this issue, and the findings of the Auditor General can thereby be partly explained by the findings of Skjønberg (ibid.) In other words, as long as there is no change in the focus on Sustainable Development including environment, it is not surprising that the institutionalisation of environmental considerations has still not occurred.

It might be part of an explanation that the interest in environmental issues and Sustainable Development was at its highest in 1989 and had fallen dramatically by 1993 (Langhelle 2000: 175). Langhelle argues that it is evident that Sustainable

¹⁰⁸ Submitted to parliament in November 2002.

¹⁰⁹ Environmentally targeted development aid= both development aid projects whose primary aim is to improve the environment, and activities that aim to integrate environmental factors into all types of development aid projects, in order to avoid damage to the environment as a result of the project.

Development has lost some of its political momentum (*ibid.*), and I think that shifting trends can have an influence on institutions as well as individuals. When Parliament adjusts its priorities according to shifts in opinion (*ibid.*), it is natural that institutions placed under it are affected too. The size of NORAD as an institution and thereby the level of bureaucratisation plus the possible ‘path dependency’¹¹⁰, will although lead back to old patterns when the different trends wear off. It will have to be a very strong demand from the authorities over a long period of time for something to lead to a real change in such an institution as NORAD, unless it is something that is already there just getting renewed focus, or is easily integrated into the traditional aspects¹¹¹.

Since my findings have led to the conclusion that the consideration of environmental factors has not been properly implemented, further exploration is needed to find reasons for this. First, it seems that the pressure from the authorities hasn’t been strong enough or focused enough. There have been other demands on NORAD that have taken over the main focus, which results in less pressure to integrate environmental factors and thereby no real change. Second, when various of the employees in NORAD are focused on the traditional developmental issues, and maybe not able or willing to see the importance of integrating environmental factors in the development work, “business as usual” will probably be the result. One reason for the disagreement on whether environmental factors have been integrated or not, is due to different interpretations by different people. Some find that it has been integrated, that they work according to the strategies and that environmental factors are always considered. Others, especially former and current employees with a strong interest in environmental factors, find that it has not been fully integrated. This view is supported by the reports by Skjøsberg and the office of the Auditor general and my own findings and observations¹¹².

¹¹⁰ For further contemplations on ‘path dependency’ see sub-section 4.2.4 above.

¹¹¹ By traditional aspects I am referring to social- and economic development which have been the main focus areas for NORAD since the beginning in the 50s. Something that is already a part of these aspects, like for example education and good governance, will not constitute a problem when getting renewed focus, because they are already institutionalised in NORAD.

¹¹² For references to the two mentioned evaluations, see above or in the bibliography.

This does not mean that environmental factors are not considered, in many cases environmental issues are considered to full extent. The problem is that environmental considerations have not been institutionalised, which means that it is not properly secured that environmental factors are *always* considered, or considered well enough. The stability and continuity of NORAD in environmental issues is thereby not secured. It is likely that the competence on social and economic development is higher than the competence on environment, since the first two have been an important part of NORAD during the entire history of the institution. One can maintain that the employees with knowledge, education and a special interest in environmental factors will make sure that necessary considerations are made, whilst employees who don't see the importance of environmental factors might not make or have the necessary considerations made by environmental experts. Logically enough, it seems that the danger of not having environmental consequences secured is most likely to happen in projects which are not directly environmentally targeted. Even if the environmental consciousness is high in SLAMU, a major mistake was made when the building of the new headquarters started. This will be elaborated on below, in section 5.2.

It seems that there is very little change of personnel in NORAD, which might be part of an explanation to the difficulties in changing/adapting to 'new' policies. The employees very often work for NORAD an entire lifetime, only broken off now and then by leaves for other temporary employment. After some time almost all of them come back, and two employees said that it is because it is so great to work there (Biseth 2002 [interview], Moen 2003 [interview]). Two others who worked there for a shorter period of time, and one of them who tried to implement new policies, are very critical towards the 'way of work' or the institutional culture. Even some current employees think that there is a resistance in the NORAD system at some level, against integration of environmental considerations in development co-operation. Smaller institutions like embassies change more often because of changes in personnel, especially changes in leadership can lead to very profound alterations, which many employees and people collaborating with embassies have experienced.

My assumptions are that the leadership has to have a genuine interest in, and will to see it through, to get environment fully integrated in all development-co-operation. These assumptions are supported by the OECD (2002: 36) list of ‘Elements of a national sustainable development strategy’. It seemed that the director general of NORAD was not fully aware of that it isn’t very visible that environment is an important aspect in NORAD (Strand 2003 [interview]). She said that it was something they had to sit down and have a look at, because she thinks it is a problem if this aspect is not visible to outsiders (on the internet and in strategies) (ibid.). It might also be an idea to put more emphasis on environmental factors in the introductory course all new employees go through. If it is stated that the integration of environmental factors is something that NORAD has difficulties with, it might motivate new employees to work towards rectifying the problem. Another possibility might be that the leadership put a stronger focus on the connection between the components within Sustainable Development; economic development, social development and environmental protection, and also the connection between these and poverty reduction.

The integration of environment in the development work is also a part of the more overarching national goal that all sectors should work within Sustainable Development. The last can thereby not be reached before the first is finalised.

5.2 On the Role of NORAD, Zambian Authorities, Sustainable Development and International Conventions in SLAMU

It is difficult to divide up the effects of the different aspects in the surroundings like I have done in the analysis, because there are so many issues that are intertwined in each other. Therefore, in this section I will sum up the interrelated effects of these institutions, conventions and concept, for SLAMU.

The picture that has emerged on the roles of NORAD, Zambian authorities, the concept of Sustainable Development and the International conventions is rather unambiguous. We can start with the last first since it is has turned out to be the least important.

As mentioned in section 4.3, the CBD is hardly known to the Zambians. The ones who had heard of it meant that it had no significance for SLAMU. Since it is not considered important by NORAD either, there was no flow of information on this convention from NORAD to SLAMU.

CITES was better known in Zambia, and one aspect of this convention was considered important, namely the ban on elephant hunting. The interviewees who knew about this thought it had a negative effect on SLAMU, except Sauvik who thought it had helped in controlling the poaching in early stages (Sauvik: Jan. 2003 [e-mail]). Child said that if sustainable hunting had been allowed SLAMU could have earned a lot more money, which would also have given people an even higher incentive not to poach on the elephants (Child 2002/2003 [interview and e-mails]). When Zambia among other countries applied to CITES to lift the ban on trade in ivory at the last conference of the parties in 2002 and it was not granted, Child argues that it is probably because the government is not trusted and because the number of elephants in Zambia still isn't very high (Child: Jan. 2003 [e-mail]).

When it comes to the role of NORAD's co-operation with SLAMU to create Sustainable Development in the project area, almost all the informants both in Zambia and Norway indicate that individuals definitely have played and still play an important role. It is the commitment of individuals which is highlighted, something I saw the importance of myself during my fieldwork. Again, Child had some important observations, in that he has highlighted the endurance of individuals both at the Norwegian embassy (NORAD) and at SLAMU (Child 2002 [interview and e-mail]). He believes that it is extremely important to have highly qualified personnel and that it is more luck for SLAMU that the desk officers at NORAD have been so dedicated, than it being a part of NORAD's make-up (ibid.). This is also an indication towards the fact that environmental considerations are not institutionalised in NORAD. As mentioned above, no one, neither in NORAD nor in SLAMU, came to think of the necessity of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) when the building of the new headquarters began. To their defence, it is important to mention that this was a one time incident and that it is being rectified in a proper manner. There is currently a massive study going on to make a Land Use Plan for the whole area, to secure that

people don't build houses too close to the national park and to make sure that everything that is built is put in a suitable place.

Many of the SLAMU employees are dedicated, but as mentioned in chapter 4, there have been problems related to the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) lately, which drain their energy and personal economies. The placement of SLAMU under ZAWA happened before ZAWA had established properly, and the economy and power relations of the authority are still not 'settled'. This means that SLAMU employees don't get their salaries on time, that ZAWA interferes in their decision-making and they are at the moment less autonomous than they were under ZAWA's predecessor, the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS). With the possibilities that lie in the Zambia Wildlife Act and with NORAD's continued presence, I believe that the problematic issues will be resolved. NORAD realises that SLAMU has come a long way and that their continued support is needed to make sure that what SLAMU has achieved will not collapse when NORAD eventually draws out.

There is one important aspect related to the recipient responsibility principle of NORAD which has been touched upon in sub-section 4.4.2 above, and needs to be briefly elaborated on in these concluding remarks. The reason for this is that it is vital in trying to bring development forward, something which requires a focus on responsibility more than on recipient. To emphasise what Munyenyenbe et. al. (2000: 114) states, empowerment can also be strengthened by holding people accountable, this way NORAD is co-responsible, and are not putting the full responsibility on a recipient which doesn't have sufficient capacity. This is supported by Mushinge's statement (see sub-section 4.4.2: 94), and by the audit of the Auditor General of Norway (see sub-sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 4.2.5 and 5.1 above).

If integration, co-operation and eradication of differences between management areas in the whole of Zambia happened as a follow up and widening of the developments in South Luangwa, the result could be extensive development and more equality for all, because collaboration between public agencies and local resource users can produce 'synergistic' outcomes (Johnson 2001: 526). Even scholars who are sceptical towards decentralisation and what it is supposed to bring in development

and poverty reduction, end up recommending it¹¹³. The scholars have different approaches and work within different fields, but the conclusions are more or less the same – to lessen the expectations a bit and be aware of that decentralisation might not bring *all* the benefits that can possibly be obtained, but in most cases, some or many benefits evolve. There is not even one who maintains that decentralisation of management responsibility for natural resources is not recommendable.

I agree with and will emphasise the advice already given to NORAD by Child and Braathen, when it comes to the development co-operation with Zambia. I would therefore advise the ones in NORAD who have not read their studies to do so. First, it means that NORAD should support the other management units under ZAWA to make sure that they can develop to the same level as SLAMU. It might be possible that they can do this together with other donors in a harmonised way, which could make the development of the other units quicker, with more funding and with all the experience gained in SLAMU. This is important because the current big differences among the territorial units create envy and efforts by ‘outsiders’ to draw SLAMU down. It must be avoided that ZAWA centrally can use fair distribution as a reason for deriving resources from SLAMU. With enduring efforts they have achieved a great deal over time, and the worst thing that could happen would be if what they have achieved was taken away by ‘outsiders’. It is also important that the people in the other Management Units and areas get the same opportunities to develop their local societies from below – that way the probability that it will be sustainable and lasting is higher.

So, on NORAD’s role we can conclude with the same observation as Braathen (2002: 172) made in the Northern Province of Zambia, namely that NORAD’s presence and intervention has created space for emerging social and political forces that challenge the political-administrative order from below. In my view, better ways of democratising and making the local structures sustainable can not be found.

¹¹³ Child, Crook and Manor, Crook and Sverisson, Johnson, Conyers, Munyenyembe, Cohen & Peterson, Ribot. In addition there are many that these scholars refer to who also recommends decentralisation.

5.3 Final concluding remarks

As I said in chapter 3, there were three things I wished to contribute to by writing the part of the thesis which involved the case study project in Zambia:

- 1) The hope that it can give possibilities of succeeding elsewhere, in that similar efforts can be made,
- 2) that it can contribute to a more positive view on development aid, as a counterweight to the negative focus often presented in most public media, and
- 3) to gain scientific knowledge about an important area of environment and development, and hopefully to be able to share it with other interested parties.

By distributing this study to stakeholders in development projects, there will be possibilities of reaching the first aim on the list. Reaching the second aim is dependent on who reads this and what views they have, because I have both been critical and positive. All in all, I still hope I have communicated that development aid definitely works well in the project I have studied. As noted earlier, the problem lies in institutional aspects of NORAD in Oslo. It should however, be fully possible to rectify these by strengthening the environmental capacity and stronger will to see through the institutionalisation of environmental considerations.

On the third point, I have gained a lot of knowledge on the sustainable use of natural resources as a means in empowerment of poor people, although there is always a lot left to learn. The issues of natural resource management, poverty reduction in a wide sense and power issues are in reality so interrelated that it is impossible to do a study of one of them, without having to relate it to the others.

SLAMU is a good example which shows us that it is possible to combine development and environmental protection through sustainable use. It is, however, difficult to reach real decentralisation of management responsibility and financial gains, because of the difficult issue of power relations. Real decentralisation has not been fully and securely reached in SLAMU, although they have come a long way. It is therefore important to consider the circumstances when trying to reach decentralisation, and not forget what Crook and Sverrisson have highlighted; that decentralisation measures are not technically neutral devices which can be

‘implemented’ without constraint, as if there were no pre-existing social context (Crook & Sverrisson 2002: 2).

The empirical findings from Zambia have shown that the decentralisation theories used are too narrow to capture the role of the CBOs. If the CBOs are considered to be a sub-group of NGOs, their positions in the local communities are undermined because they have a much wider basis than NGOs normally have. They represent the whole communities, not special interest groups. Even so, the theoretical contributions especially from Braathen (2002) and Ribot (2002 a & b) have provided me with a fruitful basis for the case study project. These contributions have also helped in putting focus on the difference between political and administrative decentralisation and to see how important it is to have a clear view of what we are talking about when it comes to decentralisation.

The institutional theoretical contributions I have used in this study have made it possible to focus on some of the institutional phenomena of NORAD and the probable effects of these on the practical development work. In other words, I have been able to capture parts of the ‘infrastructure’ of the organisation, which gives better understanding of how NORAD works and what could be done differently to get closer to sustainable development work. The empirical findings of this study don’t provide clear support to one or the other of the two different main approaches within implementation theory. Some parts of the work of NORAD and SLAMU are decision-oriented and other parts are more process-oriented, but in general there are aspects of both in most of the work. There are problematical features of both – decision-oriented implementation can lead to few possibilities for local people to influence development work which affects them, and process-oriented can undermine democratically made decisions if the goals are totally changed.

There are some aspects that I wish I could have looked more closely into; the role of central authorities, the neopatrimonialism that characterises the Zambian State, The function and role of parastatal units in development and how national structural adjustment promotes or hinders local development. The main reason why I have not gone further into this is because I didn’t get to interview the representatives of central authorities in Zambia like I had planned. My stay was too short to manage that,

although I tried to reach the relevant people several times. It can therefore be seen as a weakness of this study that their views have not been presented. However, there have been several studies which have done this more thoroughly than I have been able to use, and they correspond well with what my informants have said and my own impressions from the fieldwork and the Yearly Review Meeting of SLAMU in 2002.

Issues that I have not touched upon which would have been very interesting to study include: the role of women in local development, the impact of malaria and HIV/Aids on continuity in development efforts, the role of NGOs in democratisation and development and the future role of former CBO members in democratisation and development. These are all issues that have surfaced during my fieldwork and work with this thesis that could be the basis for further studies in the area.

On the possibilities of generalisation from this study, at least I can see similarities between this and the studies of Braathen (2002), Crook & Manor (2001) and Ribot 2002a & b). On a more practical level, I am waiting with excitement to see what the future can bring of similar projects elsewhere, both in Zambia and in other countries with comparable natural resources. I hope that I get possibilities to contribute with both information and practical implementation of future projects. Both Grøva at the Norwegian embassy (NORAD) in Zambia and Child who has a lot of experience with projects of this kind, share the excitement with me and think that a spread of similar efforts can have vast impacts on development in poor areas.

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IUCN homepages <http://www.iucn.org>

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
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N&M Bulletin <http://www.naturvern.no>

NORAD <http://www.norad.no>

Appendix 1 Figures



To maintain the unity between the Kunda people, the wildlife revenue is shared equally between the six chiefdoms. Within the chiefdom, the amount is divided equally between the VAGs.

Figure 2.3 How the money is shared in the new organisation model. (From Boje 2000:12)





Figure an example of how communities are organised (from Boje 2000).

The about 4000 adult members in Chief Kakumbi's area are organised in 5 different Village Action Groups (VAGs). At general meetings the members of each VAG elect a committee. Senior representatives from all the VAG committees constitute the Area Development Committee – the co-ordinating body of the whole chiefdom. The ADC will be transformed into a Community Resource Board under Zambia Wildlife Authority.



February 2001

Figure Organisation model – NORAD head office (from www.NORAD.no)

Appendix 2 List of interviews

NORAD (in alphabetical order):

Helle Biseth, Senior consultant, Dept for Southern Africa , Zambia-Malawi team interview Nov. 2002 and e-mail Dec. 2002

Wenche Gulnes, Adviser, country co-ordinator for Zambia, Dept for Southern Africa, Zambia-Malawi team, interview Nov. 2002 and e-mails Oct., Nov. and Dec. 2002.

Jon Lomøy, Head of Dept for Southern Africa, NORAD, Interview April 2002

Eli Moen, former country co-ordinator for Zambia, formerly in the Technical Dept. and Dept. for Civil Society and Private Sector Development. Currently on research leave. Interview Jan. 2003.

Stein Inge Nesvåg, Consultant, Dept for Southern Africa, Zambia-Malawi team. Interview Nov. 2002.

Inger Næss, Adviser, NORAD Interview December 2001 + e-mails.

Knut Opsal, Head of Unit for energy and environment, NORAD. Interviews 11.01 and 28.11.2002 + e-mails)

Leif Sauvik, former employee at the embassy in Lusaka, currently at the embassy in Dar es Salaam, e-mail January 2003.

Tove Strand, General Director. Interview 03.03.2003.

Jon Heikki Ås, Adviser, Unit for energy and environment, NORAD Interviews 11.01 and 28.11. 2002 + e-mails.

Paul Sverre Tharaldsen, NORAD. Interview and e-mail

Former NORAD employees:

Regine Andersen, former NORAD employee, now researcher at Fritjof Nansens Institute. Conversations, telephone and e-mail.

Rasmus Hansson, Director WWF Norway, former environmental adviser, NORAD Interview Apr. 2002 and e-mails Oct 2002, Jan. 2003.

Gunnar Jordfald, Director SNT, former head of environment project, NORAD e-mail Jan. 2003.

Thor S. Larsen, former second secretary Norwegian Embassy, Lusaka, Zambia and adviser at NORAD HQ, and Director of Noragric, International Centre at the Norwegian Agricultural College. Interviews Apr. 2002, and Dec. 2002, e-mails Jan, Oct, and Dec. 2002.

In ZAMBIA:

-Magne Grøva, Second Secretary Norwegian Embassy, Lusaka, Zambia (interview June 2002 and e-mails Aug, Oct. Nov. and Dec. 2002, Jan. 2003.

- Brian Child, former technical Advisor, SLAMU, currently Consultant at Development Services and Initiatives, Southern Africa. Interview June 2002, e-mails Oct, Nov. Dec. 2002, Jan. 2003.

- Thomas Mushinge, Commercial Director ZAWA HQ, former Commercial Director SLAMU. Interview June 2002.

-SLAMU interviews, all in May and June 2002:

Edwin Matokwani, Regional Manager Eastern Province, ZAWA

Lewis Mwamba, Head of personnel

Charles Skabala, Senior wildlife police officer

Patrick Sakanga, Wildlife Police officer

Mrs. Matokwani, Personnel clerk

Moses Mukumbi, Park Ranger

Enok Kamwendo, driver (employed from the very beginning in 1987)

Tindi Chimba, Data entry clerk, SLAMU, and member of core team in Land Use Planning project, WWF.

WWF (Zambia and Norway):

Rodgers Lubilo, former manager of CBNRM programme and Extension officer SLAMU, ZAWA, now land use planning coordinator WWF. Interview June 2002, e-mails Aug, Oct, Nov, 2002.

Leif Jon Fosse, Adviser, WWF Norway. Interview Apr. 2002.

Norwegian Ministry of the Environment (MoE), interviews and e-mails:

Kjell Glomnes, Dept for International co-operation. section for global co-operation.
Interview Apr. 2002.

Gunnbjørg Nåvik Dept for International co-operation, section for global co-operation.
Interview Apr. 2002, e-mail Jan. 2003.

Andre Thomas Eid, Dept for International co-operation, former environment adviser
in NORAD on leave from MoE (sept.2001-sept 2002). Interview Jan. 2003.